PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*, provides foundational doctrine on the strategic direction of the joint force, the functions of the Department of Defense (DoD) and its major components. JP 1, Volume 1, also describes the organization and command and control mechanisms of joint command organizations to execute joint all-domain operations, achieve unified action, and carry out global military strategic and operational integration.

2. Purpose

The United States military’s purpose is simple and contained in our oath to support and defend the United States Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic and to protect the American people and our interests. Since World War II, the strength of our nation and military, alongside our allies and partners, has deterred another Great Power War, but our freedom is never guaranteed. In 2023, we are witnessing an unprecedented fundamental change in the character of war, and our window of opportunity to ensure we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is closing. What we do in the next few years will set conditions for future victory or defeat. The United States military is the most effective fighting force the world has ever known, but maintaining this advantage is not a given.

The so-called liberal rules-based international order established 80 years ago is currently under tremendous strain, so the joint force must adapt now or risk losing a future Great Power War. For the first time in our nation’s history, the United States faces two nuclear armed powers who have publicly demonstrated aggression. The changing character of war and geopolitical landscape require an integrated and interoperable, multi-domain-capable, joint and coalition force to demonstrate credible deterrence. The most important thing we can do to win the next war is to deter it from happening in the first place.

To remain lethal, the joint force must keep up with these fundamental changes in the operating environment, which is why we developed and released the *(U)* Joint Warfighting Concept [short title: JWC]. The JWC nests directly under the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, so it also describes how the joint force will address DoD’s four top defense priorities—defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks against the United States and our allies and partners, deter aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict, and ensure our future military advantage. Most importantly, it challenges the warfighter to make a fundamental shift in the way they think about maneuvering through space and time in a fast-paced, high tech, rapidly changing, and exceptionally challenging environment. Yet, while a *concept* provides a unifying vision, it is *doctrine* that will guide how the joint force deters and, if needed, defeats adversary aggression.
This new JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*, provides the doctrinal principles and considerations for joint force commanders to carry out the tasks in the *National Military Strategy*, meet national security objectives, and work with allies and partners to preserve peace through strength.

**3. Application**

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication takes precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance, or the Office of the Secretary of Defense has directed otherwise. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States unless they conflict with this guidance. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with United States law, regulations, and doctrine.

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General, U.S. Army
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Discusses the role of joint doctrine, strategic uses of military force, and characteristics of joint warfighting

• Presents a framework for the profession of arms

• Provides an overview of policy, strategy, and national power

• Discusses the two general forms of warfare—conventional and irregular—as well as the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war

• Provides an outline of the theory, nature, and character of war

• Presents the principles of joint operations

• Describes joint command in the context of unified action, global integration, strategic competition, campaigning, and joint campaigns and operations

• Presents the seven joint functions common to joint operations—command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment

• Discusses joint planning

• Provides an overview of advanced doctrinal concepts, to include a global concept of operations, coordinating global effects, multiple supported commands, military support to countering coercion and malign influence, and a global perspective for responding to crises

• Discusses the practice of joint warfighting, to include posturing for armed conflict, joint warfighting and the challenges of armed conflict, and renewed competition

• Discusses how anticipating the next operational environment and harnessing the advantage of technology, leadership, and doctrine can shape the future of joint warfighting

Introduction to Joint Warfighting

Overview

Combatant commanders (CCDRs) face an increasingly complex operational environment (OE) with simultaneous
combinations of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict/war.

While each threat presents a unique challenge, CCDRs do not view them in isolation or only in the context of armed conflict, recognizing that peer adversaries employ competitive activities as essential parts of their strategy.

**Role of Joint Doctrine**

Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of military forces through the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience in warfare, exercises, wargames, and other operations requiring the use of the military instrument of national power. Joint doctrine serves to make policy and strategy effective in the application of military power.

**Strategic Uses of Military Force**

The United States (US) leverages its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing traditional tools of US diplomacy, the Department of Defense (DoD) provides military options to ensure the President and US diplomats negotiate from positions of strength.

**Characteristics of Joint Warfighting**

The basis of joint warfighting is in the CCDRs’ ability to integrate and, to the degree possible, synchronize mutually supporting and unified forces, campaigns, and operations, with all the joint functions throughout all domains and multiple areas of responsibility (AORs). The resultant synergy creates military advantage and maximizes combat capability. In pursuit of unified action, CCDRs recognize the importance and contributions of allies, partners, and the interagency process.

**Foundations of Joint Warfighting**

**The Profession of Arms**

The Armed Forces of the United States is a values-based organization. The character, professionalism, principles, and teamwork of our military members are vital for tactical, operational, and strategic success. As military professionals charged with the defense of the nation, joint leaders are experts in the conduct of warfare and require strong character and competence.

**Policy, Strategy, and National Power**

National policy is broad guidance adopted by a national government in pursuit of the national strategic objectives related to its values and interests. The purpose of military
strategy is to serve national policy—the positions and pursuits of governments and others cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex strategic environment in pursuit of national interests. The goal of military strategy is to achieve a policy’s aims by maintaining or modifying elements of the strategic environment to serve those national interests.

The US military recognizes two general forms of warfare—conventional and irregular—which may escalate to include the employment of nuclear weapons. Joint force commanders (JFCs) choose to conduct warfare, not in terms of an either/or choice but in various combinations that suit the strategic and operational objectives and that are tailored to a specific OE.

The three levels of warfare link tactical actions to the achievement of strategic objectives. There are no finite limits or specific boundaries between these levels, but they help JFCs plan and synchronize campaigns and operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. The strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of employment depends on the nature of the mission.

The strategic level of warfare integrates national policy decisions into the development and promulgation of national, defense, and military strategies.

The operational level of warfare is generally the realm of CCDRs and their subordinate components. The focus of this level is the application of operational art. CCDRs link strategy and tactics through campaigns (e.g., global campaign plans and combatant command (CCMD) campaign plans); link the operational and strategic objectives for each type of plan; and work to constantly pursue and support national, multinational, or global strategic objectives as defined by the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

The tactical level of warfare is where the conduct of battles and engagements seeks to achieve military objectives assigned to JFCs and subordinate units.

War may occur between states, between state and non-state armed groups, or between multiple non-state armed groups. Wars may occur in semiautonomous regions, conducted by armed groups that do not recognize national borders. The nineteenth-century Prussian general and strategic theorist
Carl von Clausewitz defined war as “the continuation of policy by other means.” These means can take many forms, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions. To analyze and comprehend war as a matter of policy, JFCs seek to understand the strategic interests and will that drive adversaries.

**Principles of Joint Operations**

Classical military study recognizes nine basic principles of war. However, while the nature of war is immutable, its conduct and methodology continue to evolve. Experience has identified three additional principles that, together with the traditional principles of war, now comprise 12 principles of joint operations:

- Objective
- Offensive
- Mass
- Maneuver
- Economy of Force
- Unity of Command
- Security
- Surprise
- Simplicity
- Restraint
- Resilience
- Legitimacy

**Fundamentals of Joint Warfighting**

**Joint Command**

Command is the lawful authority, by virtue of rank or assignment, a commander in the armed forces exercises over subordinates. Accompanying this authority is the responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions.

While command authority stems from orders and other directives, the art of command is in the commander’s ability to use leadership to maximize performance. The combination of courage, ethical leadership, judgment, analysis, situational awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views helps commanders make insightful decisions in complex situations.
Unified Action

Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and alignment of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Participants can include multinational forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, interorganizational partners, and even private and commercial partners. The joint force integrates actions within DoD and seeks to align actions collaboratively outside the purview of DoD. Failure to achieve unified action can jeopardize mission accomplishment.

Global Integration

Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges, while balancing risk with other missions and made adaptive through continual assessment. For execution, JFCs require a shared understanding of threats, hazards, risks, and joint force trade-offs. The objective of global integration is to prioritize operations and resources on a global basis to enable senior leaders to pursue operational- and strategic-level objectives.

Strategic Competition

Strategic competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. Nations and other actors routinely interact in the international system to pursue their strategic interests. Many interactions are cooperative or seek mutual benefit. State and non-state actors compete over incompatible aims. Whether intentional or not, the pursuit of competing interests can lead to armed conflict/war. Just as competitors can cooperate, friendly states can compete. Within an alliance, individual nations naturally seek to tilt policy in the direction most advantageous for their interests.

Campaigning

Campaining is the persistent conduct and sequencing of military activities aligned with other instruments of national power to achieve prioritized objectives over time through global campaigns, CCMD campaigns, and associated families of contingency plans. CCDRs campaign to deter attacks, assure allies and partners, compete below armed conflict, prepare for and respond to threats, protect internationally agreed-upon norms, and, when necessary, prevail.

Joint Campaigns and Operations

Joint Campaigns. A campaign is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Campaigns implement strategy and provide connectivity and continuity
between the strategic and operational levels of warfare. Campaigns may be global, regional, or functional.

**Operations.** A specific operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Most joint operations incorporate elements of all domains. Joint operations may also be global and transregional.

**Joint Functions**

There are seven joint functions common to joint operations—command and control, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Commanders leverage the capabilities of multiple joint functions during operations. The joint functions apply to all joint operations across the competition continuum. The integration of activities across joint functions to accomplish tasks and missions occurs at all levels of command.

**Joint Planning**

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve the objectives (the ends). In other words, joint planning links the military instrument of national power to the achievement of national security objectives and transforms national strategic objectives into operational objectives, operational design and approaches, lines of operation and effort, and tactical tasks and activities. Planners ensure that interagency, interorganizational, and multinational partners’ requirements inform military plans.

**Advanced Doctrinal Concepts**

**Overview**

Against a threat with global reach and strategic depth, the philosophy of a single-supported CCMD or joint force organized around an AOR-specific concept of operations may be appropriate in some instances but in others could constrain effective joint warfighting in a way that does not address the global problem. Senior leaders across DoD recognize this change in the character of war and are shifting, when necessary, from regional to global perspectives.

**Global Concept of Operations**

A global concept of operations achieves global effects through the integration of CCMD-level missions in all domains and multiple AORs in a unified effort. Multiple supported and supporting CCDRs execute these operations based on SecDef prioritization of efforts between CCMDs. CCDRs employ forces globally to arrange cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose to overwhelm the enemy.
### Coordinating Global Effects

Armed conflict may require multiple and overlapping support relationships. These relationships enable the coordination of global forces in time and tempo across multiple regions and domains to achieve campaign objectives. CCDRs use a global coordination process to ensure an appreciation of out-of-AOR threats and the capability to coordinate and integrate global capabilities, fires, operations, and information to facilitate global effects.

### Multiple Supported Commands

The integration of the joint force on a global basis requires multiple supported and supporting CCDRs. The joint force campaigns as a globally integrated force. Campaigning may require the integration of the full range of capabilities in multiple AORs and domains, each with a unique set of supporting commanders.

### Military Support to Countering Coercion and Malign Influence

Adversaries seek leverage and influence over other nations and geographic regions. They prefer to avoid war with the United States and achieve their objectives at an acceptable level of risk and a relatively low opportunity cost.

With appropriate authorization, JFCs can counter adversarial actions and malign influence through demonstration, regional repositioning, air and maritime interception operations, global deployments, strengthening and reinforcing allies and partners, countering malicious cyberspace activities, establishing exclusion zones, enforcing sanctions, information activities, and freedom of navigation operations at sea and in the air.

### Global Perspective for Responding to Crises

To support leadership decision making in a crisis, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.01, *(U)* 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP), directs the Joint Staff to lead development of strategic planning frameworks (SPFs). These serve as the primary branch planning constructs for key global campaign plans and provide direction for all CCMD contingency plans associated with each priority problem set. SPFs enable integration of plans by establishing a shared understanding of the problem, developing a common set of military objectives, articulating a strategic approach, and providing resourcing guidance for concurrent plans.

### The Practice of Joint Warfighting

### Introduction

Armed conflict/war characterizes a strategic relationship surrounding an interest or set of interests where adversaries
use lethal force as the primary means for imposing their will and achieving their objectives. The continuous employment of lethal force is a defining aspect of war and is a reflection of substantial resolve and commitment to an interest which the United States values greatly. Joint warfighting is a function of this resolve, employing various means in multiple AORs.

Posturing for Armed Conflict

The transition to armed conflict can present significant challenges for the joint force. Defeating an enemy requires civilian leaders and commanders to transition the force optimized for the global campaigns to a disposition for armed conflict. CCDRs assume they will receive little warning and focus proactively on preparedness for armed conflict.

Types of Transition. There are several methods to transition from competition to armed conflict/war:

- Adapting Contingency Plan Execution
- Contingency Plan Modification
- Planning to Execution

Joint Warfighting and the Challenges of Armed Conflict

JFCs maintain a deterrent posture with forward-deployed forces and remain ready to defeat the enemy attack, overcome surprise, and recover from a loss of initiative. The adversary can employ a mix of irregular, conventional, and informational activities that may not present a triggering event until their operation or campaign is well underway. An adversary may leverage nonmilitary aspects of power with covert, clandestine, and coercive activities to confound warning intelligence. JFCs require continually updated, relevant, and timely warning intelligence to determine whether an attack is imminent or underway. JFCs could simultaneously combat forms of enemy irregular warfare while countering misinformation, propaganda, and deception.

Renewed Competition

Clear conclusion and finality to armed conflict can be elusive. To make military victory meaningful, JFCs take on the timeless challenge of translating military success into enduring and favorable outcomes. There is no rulebook for translating military achievement into favorable outcomes. To successfully transition from armed conflict to the new competition, JFCs avoid viewing the continuing effort as requiring less focus and attention. Successful transition requires a mindset, posture, and readiness to continue
offensive operations, if necessary, as the JFCs continues to orient on the enemy and new adversaries.

**The Future of Joint Warfighting**

The joint force is experiencing a fundamental change in the character of war. Changes in how, where, and with what weapons and technologies opposing sides fight are normal. However, fundamental change is rare, and it is influencing, accelerating, and expanding the next OE to the degree that future joint warfighting will require a new way of war fought by a force that does not yet exist, guided by doctrine and led by leaders that we need to develop now.

The joint force operates in an environment in which strategic competition reshapes the distribution of power across the world, creating instability and increasing the potential for armed conflict. Anticipating the future OE and integrating modern technologies and techniques is necessary for the joint force to adapt. New warfighting technologies and doctrines materialized repeatedly throughout history and will continue to do so.

The (U) Joint Warfighting Concept is the unifying vision to guide future force design, force development, and force employment to ensure we have the right technology, leaders, and doctrine. It will continue to incorporate evolving threats to help JFCs face the future. The concept includes fidelity on key warfighting concepts and precision on the operational approaches that will enable the joint force to gain positions of advantage against peer adversaries.

Our adversaries will continue their aggressive attempts to revise the global order for their own benefits. They will continue building up military might to achieve their goals through the use of force.

The joint force will continue to work with interagency partners and in cooperation with our allies and foreign partners to deter aggression and threats to the free world.

Now and in the future, our contract with the people is that we, the US military, will always be ready to protect the Constitution and the fundamental principles of what it means to be American.
CONCLUSION

This capstone joint publication provides overarching guidance and intent, along with fundamental principles for the employment of the joint force. It describes the role of the Armed Forces of the United States as an instrument of national power.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO JOINT WARFIGHTING

1. Overview

   a. The fundamental purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States is to defend the nation and support strategic objectives across the competition continuum. Use of military power adheres to the Constitution and other legal imperatives, the highest societal values, and the concept of accountability to the people. Military commanders infuse in the fighting forces an attitude of joint integration that employs all forms of combat power to defeat our adversaries.

   b. The strategic environment is a set of complex, dynamic, and adaptive political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the others, creating common and competing interests. Within this environment, nations and other international actors seek to gain or maintain influence to pursue their interests at an acceptable risk and a sustainable cost. Such an environment poses dilemmas for United States (US) decision makers and joint force commanders (JFCs); can result in uneven US and allied physical and informational responses; and may weaken US alliances and partnerships that promote security, trade, economic development, diplomatic agreements, and rules-based international order. The term “JFC” is used, as appropriate, to include combatant commanders (CCDRs), subordinate unified commanders, or joint task force commanders.

   c. JFCs face an uncertain future; the challenges are multifaceted, complex, rapidly approaching, and unrelenting—demanding comprehensive modernization of our forces, concepts of employment, supporting technology, infrastructure, and training.

   d. Advances in technology increase the tempo and lethality of warfare. Technologies that reach across space and cyberspace characterize the instantaneous and persistent global reach of information. Societies have critical dependencies on advanced information and communications technologies. These changes pose challenges to joint forces. Terrorism, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, and adversary information activities further complicate the strategic environment.

   e. US adversaries range from peer competitors to violent non-state actors. These adversaries increasingly integrate military force and information activities along with other instruments of national power to create combinations of lethal and nonlethal effects. They can do so with greater sophistication and less constraint from geographic, legal, or moral boundaries and factors. Moreover, some adversaries have the strategic depth to wage protracted warfare against the United States. As these potential threats often span more than one nation or combatant command’s (CCMD’s) area of responsibility (AOR), without regard for distance and time, they can spur multiple, simultaneous, interconnected challenges. Similarly, the consequences of a single event can create higher-order effects and decrease available decision time. Therefore, CCDRs face an increasingly complex operational environment (OE) with simultaneous combinations of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict/war. While each threat presents a
unique challenge, CCDRs do not view them in isolation or only in the context of armed conflict, recognizing that peer adversaries employ competitive activities as essential parts of their strategy.

f. Armed conflict is inherently transregional, as enemies’ interests, influence, and capabilities extend beyond traditional and recognized international order and boundaries. Significant and emerging challenges include conventional armed conflict; attacks in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and employment. Additional challenges include terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction; adversary information and influence activities; and proliferation of an adversary’s exclusion zones, enforced through antiaccess and area denial capabilities. Long-range antiaccess capabilities may prevent or delay the joint force from entering an operational area (OA). If a force can overcome an enemy’s antiaccess capabilities, additional area denial capabilities can still limit a force’s freedom of action.

g. The pace and scale of change in the character of future joint warfighting means JFCs must simultaneously address urgent problems of today while setting conditions for warfighting advantages tomorrow through concepts, doctrine, rapid technological adaptation, and future-focused leaders. The joint force must develop and integrate doctrine with force attributes that enable JFCs to anticipate and prevail in armed conflict.

h. JFCs need doctrine that enables them to adapt to rapid changes in the conduct of warfare. Adaptation is the cornerstone of the JFC’s effectiveness in joint warfighting. Anticipatory doctrine assimilates diverse sources of knowledge—lessons learned from combat as well as exercises, experiments, and wargames—to provide JFCs an improved perspective on the direction of military change and the intellectual tools needed to incorporate innovation and adaptation in everything we do.

i. Most adversaries prefer to achieve their strategic objectives without resorting to armed conflict, but they also compete to gain a position of advantage in the event of armed conflict. Their ability to operate by manipulating popular perceptions and using nonmilitary means has produced strategic gains that threaten US security interests. Navigating the OE requires CCDRs to develop relationships, comply with specific policy that can change from AOR to AOR, and develop and implement approaches that deter or counter adversaries.

2. Role of Joint Doctrine

a. The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of US forces. Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of military forces through the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience in warfare, exercises, wargames, and other operations requiring the use of the military instrument of national power. Joint doctrine serves to make policy and strategy effective in the application of military power.

b. Joint doctrine is based on extant capabilities (i.e., current force structures and materiel). It incorporates time-tested principles such as the principles of war, strategic art,
Introduction to Joint Warfighting

operational art, and elements of operational design for successful military action, as well as contemporary lessons and best practices. It does this by promoting a common perspective and establishing a common set of terminology, from which to plan, train, and conduct joint campaigns and operations that fundamentally shape the way the Armed Forces of the United States think about campaigns, operations, and activities. However, joint doctrine is not an intellectual straitjacket. Its procedures are not a binding constraint or standing limitation. JFCs need to understand doctrine so that they also recognize when they should depart from it.

c. Using joint doctrine can enable JFCs and their staffs to focus their efforts on solving strategic and operational problems. Joint doctrine facilitates development of a common joint culture and understanding. The JFC should also encourage the development of new and innovative capabilities—including joint tactics, techniques, and procedures—that improve the effectiveness of the joint force.

d. Across the competition continuum, the joint force campaigns to help protect and advance the United States’ interests. In competition, success is expanding the freedom to pursue those interests and increasing strategic options while limiting our adversaries’ opportunities, all at an acceptable risk and a sustainable cost. In armed conflict, it means prevailing against our enemies. Joint doctrine provides considerations and operational principles to help JFCs navigate and succeed through various demanding environments.

3. Strategic Uses of Military Force

The United States leverages its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing traditional tools of US diplomacy, the Department of Defense (DoD) provides military options to ensure the President and US diplomats negotiate from positions of strength. DoD is in a supporting role when the military instrument of national power is not the primary strategic means. When other instruments of national power prove insufficient, the military may become the nation’s primary means. In either case, the military contribution is essential, as it enables and reinforces the application of the other instruments of national power. Whether in a primary or supporting role, there are four strategic uses of military force—assurance; both forms of coercion, deterrence and compellence; and forcible action.

a. Assurance (to assure) is using the instruments of national power to demonstrate commitment and support to US allies and partners. Military assurance often takes the form of security cooperation, combined exercises, and the forward stationing of US forces. Exercises and the forward posture of US forces provide security; advance interoperability with allies and other partners; and create opportunities for strategic messaging related to theater security, partnership, and disaster response, which helps assure these partners. Additionally, assurance (or reassurance) is a fundamental enabler to a state’s use of coercion—a state makes clear to an adversary what behaviors are desired and undesired. By signaling our intentions effectively, the United States emphasizes that it will abstain from carrying out its threats if the adversary complies with the demand. Assurance also communicates to an adversary that its compliance will not lead to further demands. The adversary who contemplates succumbing to coercive measures or abstaining from action
may need specific and reliable assurances that the United States will carry out its part of the agreement.

b. Coercion is a broad concept that encompasses two distinct forms of persuasion or intimidation—deterrence and compellence. Deterrence seeks to maintain the status quo before an adversary shifts policy or takes undesired actions. Compellence is a commitment and an attempt to modify an adversary’s inaction or ongoing behavior. Deterring behavior requires signaling through passive threats and activities to convince an adversary not to encroach, while compelling behavior requires active measures along with specific demands to drive an adversary toward a new behavior or out of a position established through previous encroachments. Executing deterrence and compellence requires blending the effects of multiple instruments of national power. An analysis of coercive options demands a careful knowledge of the adversary’s value system. Coercing behavior works by manipulating the value an adversary places on an object and influencing their perception of the costs of action or inaction regarding that interest.

(1) Deterrence (to deter) is the practice of discouraging an actor from taking unwanted action. JFCs apply force employment options to signal and demonstrate the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable US counteraction or the adversary’s belief that the costs of a future action outweigh the perceived benefits. Deterrence by denial instills the perception that success is unlikely, while the threat of punishment creates the perception that the costs are too high. JFCs deter adversaries by maintaining readiness, exercising the ability to project power globally, and demonstrating sufficient capability to reinforce perceptions. JFCs employ actions below the threshold of armed conflict, including countering adversary activities, nonlethal actions, reinforcing narratives, and multinational security cooperation and training. The United States can employ joint forces to support diplomatic and economic instruments of national power in deterring adversaries.

(2) Compellence (to compel) is the use of military force to influence an adversary to modify or desist from an ongoing behavior or do something they would rather not do. Compellence differs from deterrence in that the goal is to change an adversary’s existing behavior. Compelling behavior typically requires more than just rhetoric. Compellence relies on an understanding of the perspective of the adversary and carries a higher risk of escalation than deterrence. An actor coercing a change in behavior usually has to take action; simply issuing a threat is often ineffective. In contrast to forcible action, the point of compellence is that the choice of compliance remains with the adversary. The adversary may not like the choices, but the United States can impose costs with restraint. This leaves the adversary the choice of continuing to suffer the cost or acquiescing to the United States’ demands. In calculating the efficacy or viability of compelling behavior, the United States seeks to understand an adversary’s determination, stake in the interest at hand, strengths, and vulnerabilities.

c. Forcible action (to force) is the violent application of military force to project our will on the enemy by eliminating their resistance. If an enemy values an objective that threatens our national security, then it is imperative to use military force to destroy that which gives the enemy the ability and will to resist. Forcible action requires the national will to win and the means available to do it decisively. The three basic methods to prevail
in armed conflict against an enemy are exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation. Exhaustion is the erosion of the enemy’s will, attrition is the process of gradually reducing their strength or effectiveness, and annihilation is the destruction of the enemy’s means. The joint force rarely employs one of these methods in isolation from the others. Collectively, all three reduce the effectiveness of an enemy through loss of personnel, materiel, morale, or commitment. Against a capable and determined enemy, JFCs do not assume these methods to be easy, quick, or inexpensive. Additionally, JFCs do not expect military victory to be a foregone conclusion.

4. Characteristics of Joint Warfighting

Joint warfighting is how all components of the Armed Forces of the United States task organize within an OA together and unify in pursuit of a common military goal. The basis of joint warfighting is in the CCOs’ ability to integrate and, to the degree possible, synchronize mutually supporting and unified forces, campaigns, and operations with all the joint functions throughout all domains and multiple AORs. The resultant synergy creates military advantage and maximizes combat capability. In pursuit of unified action, CCOs recognize the importance and contributions of allies, partners, and the interagency process. This includes the priorities, capabilities, and resources of other, non-DoD agencies that support effective joint warfighting.

a. CCOs conduct joint warfighting through joint campaigns and operations. Joint warfighting is a comprehensive effort in scale, tempo, and scope. US adversaries are capable and determined. US adversaries can employ deception, conventional forces, coercion, irregular tactics, terrorism, criminal activity, and operations in the information environment to complicate operations. Joint warfighting may include overlapping missions executed by multiple CCMDs operating together to defeat the enemy’s will, strategy, and capabilities. Throughout the overlapping missions, each CCO possesses and contributes unique capabilities and expertise. Therefore, the more capable the threat, the more complex the relationships between CCMDs, requiring CCOs to tailor and organize each joint force appropriate to their specific OE.

b. Joint warfighting requires JFCs to integrate forces throughout the OE, which includes all domains and the information environment, to create military advantage. A CCO’s OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the commander’s decisions. This environment encompasses the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); and the electromagnetic environment. While the joint force is organized by law into unified commands with physical AORs and transregional responsibilities, it can function as an integrated force with common strategic objectives through the global integration of joint forces. JFCs conduct operations at all echelons down to the small-unit level by using common tactical approaches, shared situational awareness, and interoperable weapons and equipment. The integration of the joint force enables JFCs to produce combined effects greater than the sum of the components.
c. JFCs avoid the adversary’s strengths and exploit their weaknesses. JFCs integrate and synchronize applications of all appropriate and available capabilities. Recognizing that even finely tuned plans rarely unfold as designed, JFCs know success requires them to adapt continually, based on evolving situations and opportunities presented by the adversary and other factors in a dynamic OE. JFCs confront and endure surprise and setback but avoid inconclusive actions or stalemate. Armed conflict continues until one side begins to adapt and adjust to the OE faster than the opponent. As joint forces adapt, they begin to create marked advantages and seek to exploit these advantages to perpetuate and expand freedom of action and operational reach.

d. JFCs integrate physical actions and information. Physical actions, military and nonmilitary, are inseparable from their psychological effect. This effect directly or indirectly influences the perceptions and behaviors of adversaries. Pervasive media and social networks create an interconnected OE that magnifies and multiplies psychological effects. These influences can affect the will to fight and the popular support for one side over another. Therefore, JFCs, by shaping perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors, integrate information activities throughout joint operations to legitimize US actions while simultaneously delegitimizing adversary and enemy actions. JFCs attack and exploit information.

e. Joint planning nests information activities within other operations to achieve objectives ranging from building legitimacy to influencing the action of a specific group. This integration depends on the preparation of the OE and requires the JFCs to understand the motivations that can provide early warnings of these influences.

f. Joint warfighting frequently involves fighting alongside or integrated with allies and partners as part of a multinational force. The joint force rarely pursues strategic objectives acting alone. The United States’ global network of allies and partners constitutes a strategic advantage over our competitors. Coordination with the Department of State (DOS) to integrate allies and other partners is central to how the joint force operates globally. In the conduct of military activities, JFCs rely on allies and other partners to increase capacity, provide unique capabilities, enable access, share information, and extend operational reach to achieve objectives. JFCs consider partner capabilities to address these challenges.

g. Joint warfighting requires resilience. JFCs achieve resilience through training, force, and personnel development, as well as protection measures, depth, redundancy, exchangeability, interoperability, redundancy, dispersal, and by maintaining morale, so a single attack is not incapacitating. Alternatively, optimizing efficiency can create vulnerabilities. Joint training enables the continued development of leaders and personnel responsible for executing military operations. Protection measures include not only physical barriers against attack but also virtual barriers to protect against threats from cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Depth at the strategic level of warfare provides the ability to replace capability and capacity with strategic reserves or materiel from the industrial base. In cyberspace, commercial partners can act as a strategic reserve by providing threat warning and protection of key terrain in civilian cyberspace upon which
the joint force relies. At the operational level of warfare, redundancy and depth provides resilience in time and space for the current and future campaign or operation.
CHAPTER II
FOUNDATIONS OF JOINT WARFIGHTING

1. The Profession of Arms

The Armed Forces of the United States is a values-based organization. The character, professionalism, principles, and teamwork of our military members are vital for tactical, operational, and strategic success. As military professionals charged with the defense of the nation, joint leaders are experts in the conduct of warfare. They also require strong character and competence—products of lifelong training, experience, and education.

a. In the profession of arms, character entails legal, moral, and ethical adherence to the values of the joint force and the discharge of appointed duties in a professional, apolitical, and honorable manner. The personal and collective character of the Armed Forces of the United States is central to maintaining the trust Service members have in each other and the confidence US citizens have in their military.

b. JFCs and other leaders integrate forces into smoothly functioning joint teams. Security threats present unique, broad, and complex challenges to global stability. The military professional applies critical and creative thinking to counter these challenges and continually grows through education, broadening experiences, and other professional development to account for greater responsibility at higher ranks and the constantly evolving character of warfare.

2. Policy, Strategy, and National Power

National policy is broad guidance adopted by a national government in pursuit of the national strategic objectives related to its values and interests. The purpose of military strategy is to serve national policy—the positions and pursuits of governments and others cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex strategic environment in pursuit of national interests. The goal of military strategy is to achieve a policy’s aims by maintaining or modifying elements of the strategic environment to serve those national interests.

a. Policy. National policy represents the decision by senior leaders to pursue a specific approach or strategy regarding US interests. As such, policy is usually the result of deliberation among policymakers. National policy articulates US strategic objectives and the degree of effort envisioned to pursue those objectives. Senior military leaders must be attentive to policy, as it guides joint force development and employment. Policy also guides assumptions, available resources, permissions, and limits of action. Policy can vary widely; therefore, the employment of military forces is particular to a specific situation. Military advice to policymakers is effective when it includes a realistic appraisal of both current and future capabilities, as well as the risks and potential consequences of military action. Policy may require a military strategy that reduces strategic risk but may incur greater operational or tactical risk. In the same way that tactics support operations, military strategy necessarily serves national policy, while providing insights to the costs incurred in attaining those policy goals.
b. **Strategy.** Strategies are ideas or sets of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a coordinated and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, or multinational objectives. Strategies articulate broad approaches to protect or advance US policy interests and identify necessary resources and authorities. The United States implements its national strategies globally, through combinations of its instruments of national power. A credible military strategy to implement policy requires achievable ends. JFCs make inferences or assumptions when implementing strategy. The specific ways and means will steer the approach military leaders may offer to the President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to achieve the ends. As a result of policymaker interactions, recommendations mature; the attendant risks, costs, and possible outcomes become more evident; and initial strategic objectives may undergo refinement. Therefore, formulating, executing, and adapting military strategy is dynamic and iterative, as unexpected events and crises may radically affect a strategy and require JFCs to refine and update previous assumptions.

(1) National strategy usually does not address specific operational and tactical ends and does not consider military power in isolation from other sources of national power. It defines the direction for the entire country and includes all the instruments of national power. In other words, a national strategy is a country’s overarching “strategy of strategies.” However, for any strategy to work requires at least the partial alignment of many small and large things. Senior civilian leaders have to accommodate many different interests and execute many events at all levels across the instruments of national power. National strategy secures and advances a nation’s enduring core interests over time.

(2) The primary expressions of national strategy for JFCs are the President’s national security strategy (NSS) and policy guidance issued through the National Security Council (NSC). These provide a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. In the ends, ways, and means construct, the NSS provides the ends. The NSS aligns and directs the instruments of national power in support of policy objectives.

(3) The national defense strategy (NDS) describes how DoD contributes to the execution of the President’s NSS. The NDS translates the national interests and objectives in the NSS into prioritized defense objectives for DoD and articulates DoD’s approach for developing and employing military forces and departmental resources to protect and promote US national security interests. The NDS is SecDef’s preeminent strategic document for DoD, providing guidance on force employment, force planning, force design, posture, programming, and other activities. It provides the framework and prioritization for all subordinate DoD strategic guidance and activities. NDS guidance serves as the launch point for structured DoD strategy assessments and deliberations to ensure its implementation and adjustment as the environment evolves.

(4) The national military strategy (NMS), developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), describes how the Armed Forces of the United States supports the objectives of the NDS. The broad scope of the CJCS’s responsibilities suggests a continuum of strategic direction spanning force employment, force development, and force
design to achieve our defense strategy. The NMS provides direction to employ the final piece of the ends, ways, and means construct—the means.

(5) Military strategy is the art and science of achieving national policy ends through the military instrument of national power. The CJCS adapts the same iterative decision, planning, and assessment process to align joint operations, activities, and investments with strategic objectives. Military strategy is not planning or a campaign plan. It guides and directs military operations but is separate and distinct from the elements of a Joint Staff or CCMD campaign plan. The framework in a military strategy provides a lens for subsequent campaign planning and contingency planning. Unlike national strategy, the scope of a military strategy is limited to the military instrument of national power. To be effective, military strategy must integrate with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

c. **Instruments of National Power.** The ability of the United States to advance its national interests depends on the United States Government (USG) achieving its policy aims as stated within the NSS. Military power aligns with the other instruments of national power to achieve a whole-of-government approach to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. Directed by the President and managed by the NSC, this approach confronts all global security threats. The NSC advises the President on how to meet national interests and goals. It also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating policies among various USG departments and agencies.

(1) **Diplomatic.** Diplomacy is the instrument of national power that uses diplomatic relations and activities to engage other nations and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives. This includes organizing coalitions and alliances, as well as eliciting foreign support for US military operations. Diplomacy may include support to sympathetic groups opposing a hostile regime or occupying power, outreach to diasporic populations, the use of international organizations to achieve strategic objectives, or the arbitration or mediation of international and internal disputes. DOS is the USG lead for foreign affairs. It has regional and functional bureaus with which CCDRs coordinate to align military and diplomatic operations in their assigned AORs. In a foreign nation, the chief of mission, normally the US ambassador, has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those under the command of a CCO, a USG multilateral mission, or an international organization. CCDRs coordinate with the chief of mission and the country team on diplomatic-military activities, including the credible threat of force, as this reinforces and, in some cases, enables the diplomatic process.

(2) **Informational.** Information is a significant instrument of national power and a strategic resource critical to national security. The information environment is the aggregate of social, religious, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are affected by information. This includes the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information. Information as an instrument of power was previously considered in the context of nation-states. However, non-state actors such as terrorists and transnational criminal organizations also use information to further their causes and undermine those of the USG and our multinational partners. When properly
coordinated, the informational instrument of national power serves as a force multiplier. The laws of physics do not limit the creation of effects in the information environment in the same way they limit lethal effects; information can exist everywhere in all mediums at once and can be interpreted differently. Information is the most easily employed of all the instruments of national power and can be employed at relatively low cost with minimal resources. Information, if used skillfully, can be difficult to attribute, which provides the JFC more options. These characteristics also mean that both state and non-state actors can wield their power to create significant effects that support their desired objectives.

(a) DoD, in coordination with the other USG departments and agencies, uses information to affect the way in which humans and systems behave or function. The effective use of information can assure, deter, compel, and force relevant actor behaviors that support US interests.

(b) In an age of interconnected global networks and evolving social media platforms whose audiences derive meaning, correctly or otherwise, from observed action or activity, DoD supports the USG’s informational instrument of national power by planning and conducting operations that reinforce and leverage those informational aspects inherent in military activities. This is a focused effort to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to national interests, policies, and objectives. DoD actions, words (written or spoken), or images displayed or released communicate a message to US and foreign audiences that may have strategic implications. In coordination with whole-of-government efforts, DoD makes every attempt to coordinate, align, and promote an understanding of how key audiences perceive the execution of DoD strategies, plans, and operations.

(3) Military. The fundamental purpose of the joint force is to win the nation’s wars. In the nuclear age, an equally important purpose is to deter war. If war is inevitable, then limiting escalation is crucial. The military instrument of national power can include the use of force throughout the competition continuum. The United States employs military forces in support of strategic objectives. JFCs can apply military force in cooperation and competition to assure allies and partners, to deter adversaries, and to coerce or force enemies and adversaries to comply with USG demands. Regardless of when or where leaders employ the military, joint forces abide by standards for the profession of arms and the law of war.

For more information, refer to Appendix A, “Law of War.” See also Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

(4) Economic. The economic instrument of national power focuses on furthering or constraining others’ prosperity and power through the use of commerce, trade, fiscal and monetary policies, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, tariffs, foreign aid, debt relief, and price manipulation to achieve favorable strategic objectives. In the international arena, the Department of Commerce and Department of the Treasury work with DOS and DoD, other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, and international financial institutions to incentivize, target, and coerce changes in the behavior and the economic interests of adversaries and enemies.
(5) In addition to the instruments of national power, the United States leverages supporting elements to these instruments. The supporting elements contribute to national power without direct application. These elements may be tangible (e.g., geography, demography, natural resources) or intangible (e.g., national unity, political purpose, resolve).

d. The alignment of the instruments of national power is fundamental to advancing and protecting US interests. The USG’s ability to achieve its national objectives depends on employing the instruments of national power in effective combinations for all possible situations. At the President’s direction, military power aligns with other instruments of national power. To accomplish this, DoD coordinates with the other USG departments and agencies to develop an understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in which military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other. The use of the military instrument of national power increases relative to the other instruments as the need to compel an adversary by force increases. The NSC plays a key role in aligning all instruments of national power to facilitate Presidential direction and unified action.

e. Interests are the perceived needs and aspirations of an actor and are generally enduring. US national interests determine our involvement outside our borders. All actors have interests and, inevitably, some of those interests conflict with the interests of others. Our interests usually fall into three categories:

   (1) Vital—if threatened, poses an existential hazard to the US population, territory, or civil society.

   (2) Important—if threatened, poses a catastrophic or significant hazard to US population or territory.

   (3) Peripheral—if threatened, poses a risk to US population or territory or a moderate risk to key partners or regions.

3. Warfare

   a. Introduction

   (1) Warfare is “the how”—or the ways—of waging armed conflict against an enemy. The character of warfare varies, influenced by evolving methods, technologies, and capabilities; the instruments of national power; and other social, infrastructural, physical, and temporal factors.

   (2) Understanding the changing character of war helps planners frame the context of warfighting. In a world where fragile critical infrastructure connects widely through cyberspace, and sabotage and terrorism have profound effects, adversaries can easily escalate a conflict. Inevitably, the dimensions of any particular security challenge may not align precisely with existing boundaries or command structures. Likewise, the conventions and conduct of war are continually changing. Although specified in the Geneva Conventions, exactly who is a combatant and what constitutes a battlefield are rapidly
shifting beyond previous norms. Adversaries, even though signatories to the Geneva
Conventions, may not abide by them (e.g., targeting of civilians). Then again, warfare may
become a more traditional contest between nations when it develops into a conventional
force-on-force conflict. When considered in its totality, warfare may significantly affect
operations throughout the entirety of an AOR and extend into others. Context helps leaders
make informed choices about command and control (C2), force structure, force
preparation, the conduct of joint campaigns and operations, and rules of engagement.

(3) Translating operational success into strategic outcomes is the ultimate
purpose of war. Tactical and operational military successes do not necessarily or naturally
lead to strategic success. Therefore, while near-term success in tactical engagements and
battles is essential to successful operations and campaigns that consolidate military gains
and secure military victories, JFCs continue campaigning to establish the conditions and
influence the behaviors necessary to achieve strategic objectives.

b. Forms of Warfare. The US military recognizes two general forms of warfare—
conventional and irregular—which may escalate to include the employment of nuclear
weapons. JFCs choose to conduct warfare not in terms of an either/or choice but in various
combinations that suit the strategic and operational objectives and that are tailored to a
specific OE. In some cases, adversary actions force the JFC to select specific ways and
means. Warfare does not always fit neatly into one of these subjective categories but
incorporates all aspects of conventional warfare and irregular warfare (IW) when in tandem
or parallel. Military activity (or inactivity) may be communicative if observed and
perceived by actors as affecting them. A nation-state’s purpose for waging war is to impose
its will on an enemy and avoid imposition of the enemy’s will. Winning a war requires
creative, dynamic, and synergistic combinations of all US capabilities. Achieving strategic
objectives often depends on the population indigenous to the OA accepting the imposed,
arbitrated, or negotiated result.

(1) Conventional Warfare. This form of warfare is a violent struggle between
nation-states or coalitions, and alliances of nation-states, fought with conventional forces.

(a) In conventional warfare, nation-states fight each other to protect or
advance their strategic interests. Campaigning as a part of conventional warfare normally
focuses on an enemy’s armed forces, their capabilities, and seizing key terrain to influence
their government. In conventional warfare, enemies engage in combat against each other
and employ a variety of similar functions and capabilities throughout the OE. In today’s
OE, enemies are challenging traditional views of warfare that blur warfare lines in their
rhetoric and their doctrine, including operations that may integrate IW, conventional
warfare, and nuclear operations.

(b) Nuclear war is an existential threat, and strategic nuclear deterrence
requires a no-fail approach. Strategic deterrence is foundational to the success of all other
missions and is the joint force’s priority mission for which it maintains the highest state of
readiness. Therefore, the United States manages the risk of an escalation to nuclear war.
This type of deterrence requires close coordination across all CCMDs to control escalation.
Additionally, the joint force supports counterproliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials of concern.

*For more information on nuclear operations, see JP 3-72, Joint Nuclear Operations.*

(c) Military victory typically results from defeating an enemy’s will, destroying or defeating an enemy’s warfighting capability, destroying the enemy’s war-sustaining capacity (e.g., defense industrial base), removing a hostile regime, or the seizure and holding of territory. Both conventional warfare and IW may consist of a tailored mix of capabilities, including cyberspace and space capabilities.

(d) Conventional warfare may also encompass state-like entities that adopt conventional military capabilities and methods to achieve military victory.

(e) The near-term outcomes of conventional warfare are often obvious, with the conflict ending in military victory for one side and military defeat for the other or resulting in stalemate. When considering forcible action, policymakers and senior military leaders must consider the operational continuity of effort, like preparedness for initiating offensive operations, consolidation, and the return to competition. These actions can ultimately determine whether military victory translates into enduring strategic objectives.

(2) **IW.** IW is a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare. The term “irregular” highlights the character of this form of warfare, which seeks to create dilemmas and increase risk and costs to adversaries to achieve a position of advantage. IW may employ the threat or use of organized armed violence for purposes other than physical domination over an adversary. States and non-state actors may conduct IW when they cannot achieve their strategic objectives by nonmilitary activities or conventional warfare.

(a) **States and Non-State Actors.** IW occurs between nations, states, or other groups. Other groups include organizations with no state involvement but that have capacity to threaten or use violence. States or other groups conduct IW to impose their will, with complementary methods contributing to the military defeat of an adversary.

(b) **Campaign.** JFCs plan, conduct, and assess IW within military campaigns as part of a broader, long-term USG effort across relevant instruments of national power to protect and advance US national interests.

1. Integrating military and nonmilitary means is essential to plan and conduct IW, as the military alone is often insufficient to achieve desired strategic objectives. The joint force plans and conducts IW in collaboration with relevant instruments of national power and with allies and partners.

2. The intent of IW is to erode an adversary’s legitimacy and influence over a population and to exhaust its political will—not necessarily to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly political authorities engaged in the struggle against the adversary.
3. JFCs may conduct IW proactively to deny access or create dilemmas for an opponent’s government, economy, or civil society.

4. In armed conflict, JFCs can conduct activities to support IW as an inherent aspect of joint operations.

5. JFCs may conduct IW proactively to undermine an emerging threat and prevent them from becoming an enemy.

(c) **Assure or Coerce.** IW can assure or coerce within the paradigm of strategic uses of military force. JFCs can assure allies and partners by demonstrating US commitment to their strategic interests. JFCs can employ IW in attempting to coerce opponents, such as deterring their future behavior and compelling them to modify their current behavior. IW operations and activities may have the following effects:

1. Affecting the legitimacy and influence of the principal actors and their partners and opponents.

2. Deterring, delaying, disrupting, or degrading opponents.

3. Countering the coercive and subversive activities of opponents.

4. Diverting, coercing, attriting, or exhausting opponents.

(d) **IW Variables.** IW employs either indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric military activities to achieve strategic objectives. Not all IW is indirect, non-attributable, and asymmetric, but IW includes one of these essential characteristics.

1. **Indirect activities** target an adversary or support an ally or partner through one or more intermediaries (e.g., allies, partners, proxies, surrogates).

2. **Non-attributable activities** target an opponent or support an ally or partner in ways that conceal the source of the activities or their sponsorship.

3. **Asymmetric activities** target an opponent or support an ally or partner when a gross disparity in relative comprehensive power causes the weaker party to resort to irregular methodologies (e.g., disinformation, terrorism, insurgency, resistance to occupation) to erode or exhaust their opponent’s power, influence, and will. However, a stronger party may target opponents asymmetrically when the risks and cost associated with a direct, symmetric approach are unacceptable.

(e) **Joint Force Conduct of IW.** IW is a joint force activity not limited to special operations forces activity. Most joint capabilities can be employed in an irregular context. All IW operations and activities require conventional force lead, facilitation, or participation.

c. **Levels of Warfare**
(1) **General.** The three levels of warfare link tactical actions to the achievement of strategic objectives (see Figure II-1). There are no finite limits or specific boundaries between these levels, but they help JFCs plan and synchronize campaigns and operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. The strategic, operational, or tactical purpose of employment depends on the nature of the mission.

(a) **Strategic Level.** Strategy is an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a coordinated and integrated fashion to achieve strategic objectives. The strategic level of warfare integrates national policy decisions into the development and promulgation of national, defense, and military strategies. Each may have a global/transregional component. At the strategic level, a nation often determines the national (or multinational, in an alliance or coalition) guidance that addresses strategic objectives and then develops and uses the instruments of national power to achieve them. The President, aided by the NSC, establishes policy and national strategic objectives. SecDef translates guidance into strategic objectives. As CCDRs fight at the global/transregional level, theater-strategic level, and operational level, SecDef guidance facilitates identification of the global and theater strategic planning requirements. Normally, CCDRs communicate through the CJCS during strategic discussions with the President and SecDef.

(b) **Operational Level.** The operational level of warfare is generally the realm of CCDRs and their subordinate components. The focus of this level is the application of operational art. CCDRs link strategy and tactics through campaigns (e.g.,

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**Figure II-1. Levels of Warfare**

- **Strategic Level**
  - National Policy
  - Global Strategy
  - Theater Strategy

- **Operational Level**
  - Campaigns
  - Major Operations

- **Tactical Level**
  - Battles
  - Engagements
  - Small-Unit / Crew Actions
global campaign plans [GCPs] and combatant command campaign plans [CCPs]); link the operational and strategic objectives for each type of plan; and work to constantly pursue and support national, multinational, or global strategic objectives as defined by the President and SecDef. Additionally, specific to warfighting, there may be multiple campaigns, each consisting of a series of operations with their own specific operational-level objectives.

(c) **Tactical Level.** The tactical level of warfare is where the conduct of battles and engagements seeks to achieve military objectives assigned to JFCs and subordinate units. Activities at this level focus on creating combat power and achieving the superiority required to achieve combat objectives. An engagement can include a wide variety of activities between opposing forces, normally occurring in a short period of time and limited physical or virtual space. A battle consists of a set of related engagements in time and space. The results of one or more battles can affect the course of an operation, series of operations, or a larger campaign. At this level, commanders generally employ and arrange forces to achieve their military objectives.

(2) The traditional framework separating the levels of warfare, as shown in Figure II-1, helps JFCs visualize a logical arrangement of missions, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. Campaigns provide the framework within which the joint force accomplishes the mission at the respective levels of warfare. However, in practice, the actual execution is more complicated than Figure II-1 suggests. With constant media coverage, expanding social media participation, and easy access to the Internet by our enemies, a tactical-level plan and resulting action can have severe operational- or strategic-level implications. For example, an action by a single individual at the tactical level could potentially cause significant disruption to operational- and strategic-level planning. Conversely, media coverage can provide positive influence to activities at all levels. In this sense, all three levels overlap during execution. Commanders and their staffs at all levels should try to anticipate how their plans, operations, and actions may impact the other levels of warfare.

4. **Theory, Nature, and Character of War**

a. **Overview**

(1) War may occur between states, between state and non-state armed groups, or between multiple non-state armed groups. Wars may occur in semiautonomous regions, conducted by armed groups that do not recognize national borders. The nineteenth-century Prussian general and strategic theorist Carl von Clausewitz defined war as “the continuation of policy by other means.” These means can take many forms, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions. To analyze and comprehend war as a matter of policy, JFCs seek to understand the strategic interests and will that drive adversaries.

(2) **Will and Means.** War is a violent clash of opposing wills. In this context, will is the act of choosing and the determination to achieve an objective related to strategic interests. In war, achieving the strategic objective may depend upon the enemy’s means
and their will to employ them. Means are the capabilities and resources an enemy can bring to bear to achieve their desired strategic objectives. Warfare is never, however, limited to purely military means. Will may vary greatly depending upon the objective and, therefore, is difficult to measure. Generally, objectives related to vital interests elicit the most amount of will, whereas those associated with peripheral interests elicit the least. Military leaders account for national will in proposing acceptable military options to national leadership. In addition, leaders are particularly cautious of situations where an asymmetry of will exists, when one side, usually the side with fewer means, has a vital interest threatened, while the other side has a lesser interest at stake. Since interest and will are related, this leads to an asymmetry of will, which can tilt the probability of commitment in the “weaker” opponent’s favor, regardless of the means available. This situation can lead to armed conflict in all its forms. Although the United States’ will may, at times, be fickle, there is plenty of evidence where, together, the United States’ will and military power were our advantage and the results were overwhelming success.

b. **Theory of War**

(1) The decision to employ military forces involves both policy and politics. Policy and politics are related but are not synonymous, and it is important to understand war in both contexts. Politics refers to the act of guiding or influencing governmental policy (actions, decisions, and outcomes). Policy refers to the general ends set by a government or large governing body and the course or principle of action adopted to achieve those ends. Policy identifies the objectives and drives a war’s conduct.

(2) As national policy may vary across the competition continuum, so may the application of violence. Senior leaders balance policy objectives with the means by which to achieve them. It is important to recognize that many strategic situations encountered by a nation are not solvable by military means. Despite the efforts and intentions of either side, armed conflict/war tends to take its own course as it unfolds. War is not an inanimate instrument but a human endeavor, which is likely to have unintended consequences that change the situation and policy repeatedly for the warring nations.

(3) War, like the politics and policy it supports, is not strictly a rational phenomenon; it also contains social, cultural, legal, and psychological elements, which can be a function of irrational motives. These can exert a strong influence on the conduct of war, as well as on war’s usefulness for solving policy-based problems. When the policy objectives are extreme, such as the annihilation of an enemy nation, then the military objectives toward destruction align with the policy objective, resulting in few policy restrictions on the military conduct of war. However, the more limited the policy objectives, the higher the probability of policy restrictions on the application of military force. Since all military actions serve policy, the restrictions on military action may be rational, but military leaders have a responsibility to advise government leadership when the limitations imposed on military action jeopardize their ability to achieve operational- and strategic-level objectives or limit the availability of alternative approaches.

c. **The Nature and Character of War**
(1) **War’s Constant Nature**

(a) War is a fundamentally human endeavor, its nature inextricably linked to our unchanging human nature. War uses violence to attain its ends. This gives it fundamental and constant qualities that define it as a distinct social phenomenon. The use of violence against other human beings arouses a level of emotion and passion, in both combatants and civilians, far greater than that aroused by any other social interaction. That passion works continuously to undermine and distort the critical analysis and lucid decision making needed to prosecute war in a manner that effectively achieves strategic objectives. As in all social interactions, uncertainty, unpredictability, chance, and human fallibility permeate war. Moreover, the danger and physical stress inherent in war magnify the effects of these characteristics dramatically. This fog and friction can degrade the participants’ ability to anticipate, adapt, and make timely and optimal decisions. Therefore, JFCs’ judgment and analysis should adapt to and accommodate the unexpected. Additionally, war’s natural tendency is to escalate as each side tries to achieve physical and psychological supremacy. Finally, war tends to take surprising turns, even in the course of a single engagement. Few wars have inevitable and foreseeable outcomes, even once they are underway.

(b) To ensure that war supports vital national interests, our leadership strives to establish clear aims that control the scope, intensity, and character of military operations. Clausewitz neatly summarized the fundamental nature of war as a “remarkable trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; the play of chance and probability; and the element of subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason.” At any given moment in a war, one of these elements may dominate, but the other two are always at work. Military professionals recognize this dynamic and understand its implications for how to prosecute the war.

(2) **The Human Aspects.** War is a clash between opposing wills; therefore, the human aspects that are central in war are the combination of language, social, religious, cultural, psychological, and physical characteristics that shape the behavior of individuals and groups. Human aspects infuse war with its intangibles, including intuition, fear, intellectual, and moral factors. Since war includes acts of nationally directed violence, the influences include human emotions, cognitions, and, ultimately, behaviors. Moreover, war is an extreme trial of physical and moral strength and tests institutional and individual endurance and resilience.

(3) **Friction.** The interplay of human aspects, unknown contingencies, and chance is what Clausewitz referred to as friction. War’s interactive nature, the duality of two (or more) independent and animate forces seeking advantage, creates the context to best understand the existence of friction as a central element in war. This sort of friction refers to all the factors and obstacles that combine to make even the smallest actions in war seem difficult, if not impossible. Anyone who has tried to start a convoy, foot march, embarkation, or operation on time has faced friction in the form of delay caused by endless, unrelated distractions.
(a) Human and physical forces can generate friction. Human forces may include fear, irrational thinking, or biases in the commander’s decision making. They might also include unclear objectives or complex command relationships. This may prevent the recognition of changes in the strategic or operational environment, thus producing planning paralysis and subsequent indecision. Friction can also be a function of physical force, whether natural, such as geography and weather, or adversarial, such as operational deception.

(b) Friction can thwart an enemy or hamper the joint force. JFCs work to generate as much friction as possible for our adversaries. JFCs cannot eliminate friction in war but can minimize its impact with rigorous training; adaptive doctrine; well-practiced planning, assessment, and decision-making processes; and rigorous leader development. The most important requirement is recognizing the reality that JFCs operate in many OEs, each with its own unique friction.

(c) Given the presence of friction in war, it may be difficult, yet paramount, for the joint force to recognize and exploit all opportunities in the OE. JFCs use decentralized decision making, reinforced by the practice of informed initiative by subordinate commanders. This decentralized decision making is the leadership philosophy known as “mission command.” Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders and commanders acting on intent.

4. **Uncertainty.** Related to friction is the reality of uncertainty. War takes place in an atmosphere of uncertainty or the “fog of war.” The reality of unknown and possibly unknowable elements is a pervasive aspect of human conflict. Despite significant investment in technologies to understand and anticipate our opponents and other variables in the OE, the existence of friction and random chance means JFCs will face uncertainty. The enemy is constantly trying to increase uncertainty through deception and other means. JFCs learn to fight in an environment of uncertainty by developing simple, flexible plans; planning for branches, sequels, and contingencies; developing standard operating procedures; striving persistently to understand the enemy’s intent; and fostering initiative among subordinates.

5. **War’s Variable Character.** While war’s fundamental nature remains constant, its character—the face or form of what it looks like—shifts, sometimes dramatically. Due to the human aspect of the societies that wage war, the scope of these changes/shifts is almost limitless. It reflects the political, military, economic, social, cultural, and technological dynamics at work in those societies, and it manifests itself in who participates, or refuses to participate, within each society, as well as why and how they do so. A critical task for senior national and military leaders is to anticipate the character of the war that might occur. That judgment should inform the political decision to fight or to take any action that could lead to war.
5. Principles of Joint Operations

Classical military study recognizes nine basic principles of war. However, while the nature of war is immutable, its conduct and methodology continue to evolve. Experience has identified three additional principles that, together with the traditional principles of war, now comprise **12 principles of joint operations** (see Figure II-2). It is important to note that not all principles of joint operations are universally applicable in every joint campaign or operation. For example, “offensive” and “surprise” are not necessarily a part of defense support of civil authorities or foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Additionally, the essence of command is the ability to take advantage of the tension between the principles of joint operations and the courage to disregard them when necessary, based on the commander’s judgement and experience.

a. **Objective.** Specifying the objective is to direct and prioritize military action toward a clearly defined and achievable goal.

b. **Offensive.** The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

c. **Mass.** The intent of massing forces or effects is to concentrate combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce results.

d. **Maneuver.** The purpose of maneuver is to place an adversary or enemy in a position of disadvantage.

e. **Economy of Force.** An economy of force expends minimum-essential combat power (lethal and nonlethal) on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts.

f. **Unity of Command.** The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

g. **Security.** Security prevents the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage.

![Figure II-2. Principles of Joint Operations](chart)

- Objective
- Offensive
- Mass
- Maneuver
- Economy of Force
- Unity of Command
- Security
- Surprise
- Simplicity
- Restraint
- Resilience
- Legitimacy
h. **Surprise.** The principle of surprise is to strike at a time or place where the enemy is unprepared.

i. **Simplicity.** The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability of success in execution by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

j. **Restraint.** The principle of restraint is to use only the amount of force necessary to influence the adversary.

k. **Resilience.** The quality of resilience enables forces to recover from loss or setback.

l. **Legitimacy.** The perception of legitimacy maintains legal and moral authority at both the national and international levels.
CHAPTER III  
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT WARFIGHTING

1. Joint Command

Command is the lawful authority, by virtue of rank or assignment, a commander in the armed forces exercises over subordinates. Accompanying this authority is the responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. Command includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

a. While command authority stems from orders and other directives, the art of command is in the commander’s ability to use leadership to maximize performance. The combination of courage, ethical leadership, judgment, analysis, situational awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views helps commanders make insightful decisions in complex situations. Commanders and staff can develop many of these attributes over time through training, education, and experience. Joint training and joint doctrine enable the conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization, decision making, and leadership. Effective commanders combine judgment, reason, and visualization with information management, situational awareness, and a sound battle rhythm to facilitate decision making.

b. Mission command refers to the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders that focus on what needs to be done rather than what to do or how to do it. Commanders focus their orders on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. It enhances C2 of forces in distributed operations by enabling more flexible and responsive decisions at a lower level. Mission command empowers individuals to exercise judgment in how they carry out their assigned tasks, emphasizing trust, force of will, initiative, judgment, and creativity. Successful decentralized execution demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. Using delegated commander’s intent, JFCs minimize detailed control, empower subordinates’ initiatives, and reduce required communications. Essential to mission command is the thorough understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command and a command climate of mutual trust and shared understanding.

c. In armed conflict, the purpose of operations is to destroy the enemy’s forces and will to fight. The purpose of operations below armed conflict may be more nuanced and difficult to define and may include multiple objectives. They frequently involve setting conditions that improve positions of relative advantage compared to that of a specific adversary, and they contribute to achieving strategic objectives in an OA without armed conflict. In either case, JFCs plan all operations to achieve the strategic objectives set by national authorities. To achieve those objectives, JFCs converge effects from all capabilities throughout the OE. JFCs must account for the authorities, processes, procedures, and time it takes to create and assess effects from certain capabilities. Each domain has a unique set of characteristics that influences how and to what extent JFCs synchronize activities throughout an operation. JFCs strive to integrate capabilities
throughout the OE (all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment), to create multiple dilemmas for the adversary.

d. JFCs delegate authority verbally; in writing, through plans, orders, or standard operating procedures; or by both methods. Examples of delegated authority are authority over an area of expertise or technical specialty, a geographic area, or specific kinds of actions. JFCs may limit delegated authority in time, or they may use an enduring approach. JFCs ensure members of the command, especially the staff and subordinate commanders, understand what authorities have been delegated to whom. Delegation not only applies to subordinate commanders but also to members of the staff. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing operations. These relationships prescribe clear responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. In some cases, JFCs provide subordinates command or support relationships that limit their commander’s authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship enables JFCs to establish clear responsibilities when organizing their forces. JFCs designate command and support relationships to enable decisive support to the concept of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate and supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and contribute to achieving the commander’s intent. Command and support relationships entail varying responsibilities to subordinate units by parent and gaining units.

e. The role of the CCDRs and other elements of the joint force in fighting war is clear. The CJCS and CCDRs have other important roles in waging wars. These include participating in the discussion leading up to a Presidential or SecDef decision and in executing and adapting from an initial decision by:

(1) **Achieving and Sustaining Coherency.** The commander needs to set ends for any use of force and align means, as well as strategies, policies, and operations and campaigns decisions, to increase probability of achieving the objectives.

(2) **Generating and Sustaining Organizational Capacity.** Translate initial decisions into action, adapt as the use of force unfolds, and bring the use of force to a successful outcome.

(3) **Maintaining Legitimacy.** Go to war for the right reasons and observe the law of war, sustain public support, and ensure proper integration of military and civil leadership.

f. **The Civil-Military Dialogue**

(1) Effective civil-military dialogue is essential to ensure campaigns and operations link to national interests. Therefore, senior military leaders understand that communication with national leaders and civilian national security professionals is essential for a whole-of-government approach. Civilian leadership often desires to maintain maximum flexibility as long as possible as the situation develops and understanding improves. Decisions are often contingent on information from senior military leaders about the expected duration, cost, and resource implications of the military
The civil-military relationship is, by necessity and design, a principal-agent relationship or “unequal” dialogue. Senior military leaders and commanders have a unique responsibility and duty to provide information and options to civilian leaders and national security professionals before the actual strategic objectives mature.

(2) Beginning at the start of the dialogue, military commanders work with their civilian counterparts to gain a shared understanding and begin to identify the problem or problems they are facing. Commanders explain their understanding of the problem and articulate the assumptions they are making. One primary goal of the civil-military dialogue is to confirm or refine the problem and necessary assumptions. An effective dialogue can identify new considerations commanders should address, based on civilian leadership perspectives. The military leadership should clearly articulate what actions military capabilities are capable of performing, the objectives these options can achieve, the costs and risks associated with each option, and how those options address the problem or problems. As the civil-military dialogue matures, the specificity of civilian leadership guidance typically increases.

(3) When discussing options for initial action or revision of ongoing campaigns and operations with civilian leadership, military leaders understand that national policy may not always align with the anticipated level of commitment or risk associated with these options. When discussing options for employment or revision with civilian and senior military leadership, JFCs should determine risks based on what actions success may require and an assessment of the time and forces required. Other considerations include the likely costs, potential for escalation, likelihood of achieving strategic objectives, and, equally important, the enduring costs of success or failure.

For more information on command, see JP 1, Volume 2, The Joint Force, and JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations.

2. Unified Action

a. Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and alignment of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (see Figure III-1). Participants can include multinational forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, interorganizational partners, and even private and commercial partners. The joint force integrates actions within DoD and seeks to align actions collaboratively outside the purview of DoD. Failure to achieve unified action can jeopardize mission accomplishment.

b. Success often depends on unified action, which requires the JFC to communicate the mission of the joint force and to understand the capabilities, limitations, and mandates of those military and nonmilitary organizations involved. The CJCS and all CCDRs are in pivotal positions to facilitate the design, planning, and conduct of unified action. The President’s guidance and direction, in coordination with other involved authorities (e.g., SecDef, the CJCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and multinational leadership), drive the character and conduct of military action.
c. Unified action starts with national strategic direction reflecting a broad governmental approach that focuses on coordination and cooperation of the US military and other interorganizational participants toward common objectives, even though the participants are not part of the same command or organization. For US military operations, the principle of unity of command enables commanders to understand the effective mechanisms to achieve military unity of effort.


d. **The JFC’s Role.** Facilitating unity of effort with interagency and interorganizational partners is both challenging and mission-essential for JFCs. Since all the elements and actions that comprise unified action are normally present at their level, JFCs play a pivotal role in unifying joint force actions. However, subordinate JFCs and component commanders also align and coordinate their operations, activities, and investments directly with the operations of other military forces and interorganizational partners to promote unified action.


e. **Multinational Participation in Unified Action.** JFCs plan and execute joint campaigns and operations with conventional and irregular forces of partner nations. Campaigns, major operations, and other operations may occur within the framework of an alliance or coalition led by the United States, or the joint force may act in a supporting role to a partner nation. Although individual nations may place different emphasis on some
objectives, the key is to find commonality within the objectives to promote unity of effort and make progress toward achieving the objectives. Cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships among counterparts may enable success. Language and communication differences, cultural diversity, historical animosities, and the varying capabilities of allies and multinational partners are factors that complicate the alignment and coordination of activities during multinational operations. Likewise, differing national obligations derived from international treaties, agreements, and national legislation complicate multinational operations. Regardless of whether other members participate within their treaty or agreement obligations, the United States remains bound by treaties and agreements to which it is a party.

f. **Interorganizational Cooperation in Unified Action.** CCDRs and subordinate JFCs often interact with a variety of interorganizational partners. This interaction varies according to the nature of the partner (e.g., capability, capacity, posture, authorities/national caveats) and the type and objectives of the operation. JFCs and planners consider the potential contributions of other agencies and determine which can best contribute to achieving specific objectives. Often, other interagency partners, primarily DOS, can facilitate a JFC’s cooperation with partner-nation agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. DoD may support other USG departments and agencies during operations; however, under US law, our military forces remain under the DoD command structure. Law or regulation, Presidential directive, policy, or agreement among or between agencies may prescribe federal lead-agency responsibility. Even when in a supporting role, the joint force is likely to provide significant support to the lead agency because of its resources and well-established planning methods.

3. **Global Integration**

a. Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges, while balancing risk with other missions and made adaptive through continual assessment. For execution, JFCs require a shared understanding of threats, hazards, risks, and joint force trade-offs. The objective of global integration is to prioritize operations and resources on a global basis to enable senior leaders to pursue operational- and strategic-level objectives.

b. **Statutory Requirement for Global Military Integration.** As required by Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 153, in matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration, the CJCS:

(1) Provides advice to the President and SecDef on ongoing military operations.

(2) Advises SecDef on the allocation and transfer of forces among CCMDs, as necessary, to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional threats.

c. The CJCS assists in the development of strategic and contingency planning and direction of the Armed Forces of the United States by developing strategic frameworks and
preparing strategic plans required to ensure their effective employment. CJCS advice informs SecDef decisions on the allocation and prioritization of CCMD resources. Subject to SecDef authority, direction, and established command relationships, the conduct of CCMD campaigns and operations is the sole purview of the CCDR. Global military integration and the global integration frameworks are the means to balance demand across regions and functions that support the overall defense strategy. The CJCS provides advice to SecDef and the President on optimizing the force to achieve strategic objectives.

d. **Guidance and Direction on Global Integration.** Joint force decision making with a transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional context may require the integration of joint forces with a global perspective. Global military integration enables SecDef, assisted by the CJCS as the global integrator, and CCDRs to make timely decisions and establish and prioritize objectives and resources for multiple geographic and functional missions. This process is necessary because of the challenges of today’s strategic environment, the realities of limited joint force resources, and expanding requirements. Force allocation decisions made case by case through the lens of an individual region or function can lead to suboptimized employment of the joint force. Global military integration enables CCDRs to reinforce geographical and functional missions and responsibilities in the *Unified Command Plan*.

e. **Global Integration Process.** The global integration process includes four overarching activities—planning, decision making, force management and employment, and force development and design. Those activities support two strategic outcomes—globally aligned operations and resources and a lethal, agile force with a consistent competitive advantage.

(1) **Planning.** Joint Staff, CCDR, and Service planning with a global perspective ensures that force allocation planning addresses transregional, all-domain, multifunctional challenges. Global planning integrates a family of planning documents—strategic planning frameworks (SPFs), GCPs, regional campaign plans (RCPs), functional campaign plans (FCPs), CCPs, and integrated contingency plans. SPFs are not plans but serve as planning tools to aid SecDef’s decision making in integrating joint force activities across the globe during a crisis or armed conflict. These planning efforts apply global perspectives to transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional problems, shifting planning from a regional, operational construct to a global campaign mindset.

*For a detailed discussion of global campaign and contingency planning, see JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations; JP 5-0, Joint Planning; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System; and CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans.*

(2) **Decision Making**

(a) Decisions occur through a shared understanding of the OE to ensure that senior military leaders can make decisions at the speed required by complex security challenges.
(b) The CJCS assists the President and SecDef in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States by preparing military analyses and assessments, options, and plans in conjunction with DoD components. Key to this is transparency; shared understanding and assessment; and visualization of the environment, risk, and opportunities.

(3) **Global Force Management (GFM) and Dynamic Force Employment**

(a) **GFM.** GFM is a group of related processes that establish strategic C2 and strategic posture and provide insight to global military force availability based on military plans and operations to support DoD’s strategic decisions. GFM integrates directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment processes for force management and planning constructs. The Global Force Management Board serves as a guiding body that provides executive oversight, strategic focus, and direction for all aspects of GFM, which aligns force requirements with priorities set out in the NMS and CJCSI 3110.01, *(U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)* [short title: JSCP] objectives and tasks. As the JSCP guides development of the GCPs, FCPs, RCPs, and CCPs, joint force readiness aligns requirements in those plans and their specific GFM requirements.

(b) **Dynamic Force Employment.** Dynamic force employment is an operational construct intended to counter geographically dispersed adversaries through global employment of ready joint forces in a manner unpredictable to adversaries. Dynamic force employment uses ready forces flexibly to influence the strategic environment while maintaining the readiness required for contingencies and ensure the long-term viability of the joint force. Based on a three-year timeframe, the GFM process aligns the joint force to balance assigned and allocated forces against ready and available apportioned forces to meet emerging strategic opportunities or contingencies as they arise. The Integrated Operations Division in the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] manages the dynamic force employment process, guided by the *(U) Global Force Management Implementation Guidance*, Joint Staff instructions, SecDef policy guidance, and SecDef execute orders.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures; (U) Global Force Management Implementation Guidance; and JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on GFM.

(4) **Joint Force Development and Design.** To build enduring advantage, the joint force provides SecDef with solutions to drive the rapid acquisition of innovative capabilities to field forces that can close critical capability gaps and posture the joint force to maintain competitive and war-time advantage. Joint force development and design is the iterative and continuous process of improving the effectiveness of the current and future joint force through concept development, assessment, capability development, and joint force proficiency. Joint force development and design assesses the joint force strategic capabilities in comparison with our enemies and adversaries, measures our current capabilities against strategic risk, and provides technological and operational solutions.
(5) **Assessments.** Strategic assessments measure the joint force’s current ability to meet security challenges with the forecasted requirements. Four efforts manage these assessments. First, the Joint Staff net assessments compare joint force capabilities and capacity against current global and regional security threats. These net assessments provide a baseline assessment and possible areas for defense innovation. Second, the annual Joint Assessment provides CCDR and Service input into the CJCS’s risk assessment by including CCDR and Service perspectives on the strategic environment, threats, challenges, opportunities, and risks and evaluating the military operational and strategic risks to US interests, and military risk to the joint force, in executing the NMS. Third, joint exercises and assessments simulate warfighting at all levels, identify gaps or weaknesses, test potential materiel and non-materiel solutions, and seek to increase interoperability. Fourth, GCP assessments inform GFM efforts. These efforts guide the development of the future force that maintains the US competitive warfighting advantage against anticipated global and regional threats. The annual joint assessment provides the CCDRs and Services the opportunity to evaluate their progress against the objectives established in the NMS and JSCP and identify sources of risk to the CJCS. These form the basis for the CJCS’s Risk Assessment, part of the CJCS’s required annual submission through SecDef to the President.

See CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, and CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, for more information.

4. **Strategic Competition**

   a. **Overview of Strategic Competition**

      (1) Strategic competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. Nations and other actors routinely interact in the international system to pursue their strategic interests. Many interactions are cooperative or seek mutual benefit. State and non-state actors compete over incompatible aims. Whether intentional or not, the pursuit of competing interests can lead to armed conflict/war. Just as competitors can cooperate, friendly states can compete. Even within an alliance, individual nations may seek to tilt policy in the direction most advantageous for their interests. Therefore, strategic competition is the persistent and long-term interaction that occurs between actors pursuing their interests across the competition continuum. Diplomats, trade representatives, and other members of the USG who regularly interact with international partners recognize intuitively that any strategic relationship mixes elements of both competition and cooperation. Success requires continuous adaptation in the application of all instruments of national power. Civilian and military leaders recognize strategic competition is a normal part of the environment, not a problem to solve.

      (2) A nation that competes successfully sets the terms of the strategic competition to advance its interests. A nation’s effective competitive action drives others to do more
of what it wants, at the time of its choosing, in the manner it prefers. Exercising international leadership is the risk, cost, and reward of successful competition. Competition is the work of establishing rules, attracting and convincing as many actors to adhere to them as much of the time as possible, incentivizing compliance, and penalizing defiance, so the rules remain intact. The prize is in the system’s structural privileging of that nation’s interests. The nation’s preferred prioritization can be evident in recognized norms. The most successful competitor achieves its objectives by aligning efforts with like-minded allies and other partners, while co-opting, subordinating, minimizing, and influencing adversary choices and decisions without invading, occupying, or destroying them. However, some states may not accept this prioritization or follow the rules set by a competitor in the absence of a good reason. Other states may agree because they find the rules attractive, suit their interests, or align with their values. Succeeding or failing in strategic competition can occur outside the military dimension and beyond the control of the joint force.

(3) This world of enduring strategic competition includes combinations of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict, along with crises. These elements refer to the relationship between the United States and others concerning specific interests. CCDRs consider simultaneous interactions with the same strategic actor that has different priority interests across the competition continuum. For instance, the United States might be competing with an actor regarding some interests, such as freedom of navigation in disputed areas, and cooperating in others, such as counterpiracy. By providing a common terminology to describe this complexity, strategic competition facilitates shared understanding, both within DoD and with the interagency partners who often have a leading role. Common terminology enables better and more precise communication, planning, and decision making.

(4) The United States has a history of confronting adversaries and reinforcing allies and partners short of armed conflict by blending the instruments of national power to change adversarial behavior. Adversaries continually probe the United States and its allies, seeking to modify norms and gain influence. However, an effective use of the military instrument of national power within a broader foreign policy does not always require armed conflict to protect strategic interests. The Cold War provides an example of the many facets of strategic competition. Instead of engaging in armed conflict directly with the other, each state fought through proxies and with surrogates as indirect means and ways to achieve their strategic objectives. Yet, the two superpowers also cooperated, such as when both backed actions in the United Nations Security Council. The United States depends on the military’s freedom to operate in waters, territory, airspace, cyberspace, and space and to influence people under conditions other than armed conflict to further US economic and political objectives.

(a) Throughout strategic competition, joint forces campaign globally in conjunction with interagency, multinational, and interorganizational partners to pursue US national interests. Strategic competition is, therefore, a complex set of interactions in which the joint force contributes to broader USG efforts to gain influence, advantage, and leverage over other international actors and ultimately to achieve favorable strategic outcomes. These efforts work best when the joint force and its interorganizational partners
apply the instruments of national power comprehensively to pursue shared or complementary objectives.

(b) Competition below armed conflict can be its own unique, challenging, and indefinite contest for influence, advantage, and leverage, where many aspects of malign influence and antagonistic behavior are simply undeterrable. Where competitions are contentious or adversarial, the joint force is primarily concerned with the restrained use of force to counter coercion. The United States has experience with all of these aspects of competition. Military institutional procurement programs focus on attaining and maintaining a credible force by fielding capabilities that provide relative advantages for extended periods. Concurrently, employing force in competition may modify other actors’ behaviors without resorting to armed conflict.

(5) Strategic guidance will direct JFCs to compete in specific places, at specific times, to achieve policy objectives required by US interests. The clearest signal of US commitment is the deployment and employment of military forces in in anticipation of or response to the unacceptable behavior of an adversary. The most effective means of communicating to an adversary the seriousness of US intent is the visible commitment of resources—spending the money required to project power, accepting the opportunity costs of not using resources in other ways, and putting military assets and Service members in potentially dangerous environments. When the principal narrative makes clear the United States values the object and stakes surrounding the contested interest, the decision to move forces from outside the region into the OA is a strong signal of US resolve. This type of signaling is effective for many situations, across many types and sizes of deployments, despite differences in the size and longevity of any prior permanent presence. Cost is a good indicator of value, and vulnerability is a good indicator of commitment. The United States has considerable flexibility in selecting which combinations of air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace forces to use when it wishes to demonstrate its resolve.

(6) Many aspects of strategic competition between the United States and other major powers take form through nonmilitary and noncoercive activities. Competitors are seeking to influence and control developments within both their regions and peripheries. To do this, they can implement strategies of co-optation and attraction, as they are often more effective than coercion. The core US strategy in the Cold War reflects this complex mixture of approaches. In its most fundamental aspects, US strategy was attractive in nature but could become coercive if necessary. The United States offered access to an economic market, including the leading economies of the world, a powerful source of cultural appeal, democratic values, and other factors that created a gravitational effect for countries pursuing their economic and political self-interest.

b. Theory of Strategic Competition

(1) There are four factors of competition—interests, influence, advantage, and leverage. The primary element is a nation’s interests. A nation advances and protects its interests by using the other, fundamentally interrelated, factors of influence, advantage, and leverage. Nations seek to gain influence, advantage, and leverage, while denying them to others.
(a) **Interests** are qualities, principles, matters of self-preservation, and concepts that a nation or actor values and seeks to protect or project to other competitors. Interests are contextual and may include the maintenance of physical security, sovereignty over claimed territory, economic prosperity, continuity of government and culture at home, and value projection in the geopolitical environment. Interests are enduring but can change over time, as other governments and other actors may interpret them differently. Campaigning and interagency actions support a strategy that promotes and protects those interests. An orientation focused on national interests is the cornerstone of a comprehensive approach to competition.

(b) **Influence** is the ability to cause an effect in direct, indirect, or intangible ways. An actor can accumulate, spend, or lose influence in relation to others. JFCs consider informed assessments about their degree of influence over an adversary’s understanding, locus of power, populations, interest groups, governance, grievances, and external support.

(c) **Advantage** is superiority of position or condition. States or other actors may create an advantage by the accumulation of influence toward a desired effect or a favorable condition. Inherently relative, a state realizes advantage through the exercise of the instruments of national power. An advantage may comprise physical or virtual aspects such as cyberspace technology, geographic access, resources, or arsenal inventories. JFCs also develop cognitive elements such as initiative, momentum, morale, and skill. JFCs create military advantage partially through activities generating recognizable qualitative or quantitative competitive advantage such as military capability, force structure, force modernization, posture, readiness, and resilience.

(d) **Leverage** is the application of a gained advantage to create an effect or exploit an opportunity. From a position of leverage, an actor is more capable of promoting and protecting its interests. Leverage also involves applying understanding of all relevant actors to increase the likelihood and scope of success.

(2) A JFC’s use of influence, advantage, and leverage can serve several interests or purposes, such as:

(a) Preparing for crisis response and armed conflict. Demonstrably preparing for crisis response and armed conflict may reinforce deterrence by affecting an adversary’s cost-benefit analysis and decision calculus. Additionally, JFCs seek to expand posture and infrastructure. As a part of preparations, joint forces may conduct operational preparation of the environment activities to develop knowledge of the OE; establish human, physical, or virtual infrastructures; and develop potential targets.

(b) Countering adversaries’ competitive strategies. Adversaries want to shape a world consistent with authoritarian views and seek leverage and influence over other nations and geographic regions. Their actions manifest themselves as territorial encroachments, infringements of sovereignty, and violations of the rule of law. In some cases, these encroachments seek to influence and control the internal domestic policy decisions of another country without having to seize or occupy parts of it. With appropriate
authorization, JFCs maneuver to contest and counter adversarial actions and malign influence through demonstration, strengthening and reinforcing allies and partners, global repositioning of forces, air and maritime interception operations, establishing exclusion zones, enforcing sanctions, supporting resistance partners, employing surrogate forces, and ensuring compliance with treaties.

(c) Supporting the efforts of interorganizational partners. JFCs support national competitive strategies by conducting tasks, activities, or operations to support interorganizational partners. JFCs can support interagency and foreign partners to enhance US national security interests. JFCs seek to improve mutual understanding of their capabilities and limitations. Establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation promotes unity of effort. JFCs play a pivotal role in facilitating unity of effort that is both challenging and mission-essential.

c. The Nature of Strategic Competition

(1) Strategic competition is dynamic, complex, and disorderly. Any discrete action can change conditions in the OE in ways that require others to adapt and evolve, often unpredictably. Cultural differences may cause one adversary to mirror, misperceive, or misinterpret the actions of another.

(2) Strategic competition is indefinite; generally consists of complex interactions over cultural, economic, geographic, political, or ideological rivalries; and often played out over decades without foreseeable resolution, until the competitors or adversaries reach an enduring political settlement and resolve the root causes of their struggle. Winning battles, or even wars, may not be strategically decisive. Reaching an enduring settlement of one dispute may result in another strategic competition against another actor, or even the same competitor, that considers the political settlement an unacceptable threat to its strategic interests.

(3) Strategic competitions vary in context and scope. Actors choose when, where, and how to compete, as competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive. Normally, nations maintain diplomatic and economic ties throughout strategic competition, and success means retaining freedom of action to pursue national interests at an acceptable risk and sustainable cost.

(4) Some nations believe they can win a strategic competition. Every action they take influences the strategic environment to set the necessary conditions for achieving their objectives through slow incremental or opportunistic change. Their strategy for competition describes how they intend to win without fighting. However, finite competitions, military or otherwise, may come and go; the underlying indefinite strategic competitions endure as long as the competitors’ interests remain incompatible.

d. Elements of Strategic Competition. Cooperation, competition, and armed conflict can, and often do, occur simultaneously. Cooperation is a feature of nearly every significant military action because the joint force rarely operates unilaterally in any significant operation or campaign. In an interconnected world, there are few circumstances
in which a major joint force activity does not have some ramifications for competition with at least one of the United States’ global or regional rivals. Cooperation and competition are always occurring, and the presence or absence of armed conflict is normally the only variable element. In either case, JFCs conduct cooperative activities with partners and competitive activities below armed conflict to counter adversaries who are seeking to turn the competition or conflict to their advantage. In armed conflict, the joint force fights to win. The joint force is never solely in cooperation but instead campaigns through a combination of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict calculated to achieve the desired strategic objectives.

(1) **Cooperation**

(a) Cooperation can be an enduring activity where the relationship with the ally or partner is in place and will continue for the foreseeable future. However, cooperation in specific areas with a partner whose overall relationship with the United States is neutral or even adversarial may be necessary. Cooperative activities can take many forms, like counterpiracy activities or force and capacity building through security force assistance. The common thread is that joint campaigns and operations through cooperation are purposeful activities to achieve or maintain policy objectives.

(b) Joint campaigns and operations during cooperation require productive relationships. A partnership is unlikely to reach its potential if the joint force approaches military engagement as discrete events rather than as part of a deliberate and continuous process. Commanders and staffs develop an understanding of the OE, a realistic appraisal of the partners’ objectives, and the nature of the partners’ relationship with the United States, to derive a range of feasible and productive military and nonmilitary options that lead to sustainable and acceptable outcomes. If done well, the resulting relationships can yield immediate tactical and operational benefits as well as enduring benefits, such as the increased commitment of a foreign military to the rule of law or greater willingness to assist US efforts. Though the immediate benefits of cooperative relationships are not always apparent, history demonstrates that long-term relationships can pay dividends in unanticipated ways.

(c) Cooperation aids competition and armed conflict by integrating the contributions of allies and partners. Cooperation is not subordinate to competition. If credible, these actions reassure a partner of US capabilities and intentions, making the partner more likely to deepen their cooperation. This can lead to increased information sharing, greater US presence, or the integration of their air defenses into a regional network. If cooperation creates a more favorable situation in the region, it counters an adversary’s pursuit of their objectives.

(2) **Competition Below Armed Conflict**

(a) In general, competition is the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, advantage, and leverage necessary to advance and protect their respective interests. Competition is continuous because the conditions that define an acceptable state are constantly changing. Competitive success requires perpetual adaptation in the
application of all instruments of national power over extended periods. In comparison with armed conflict, competition is often more indirect, the risks are different, and the expenditure of resources less burdensome. For the joint force to successfully campaign through competition, JFCs adopt a long-term approach, nuanced and flexible enough to react to rapid changes in the strategic environment.

(b) In competition, military forces provide support to other instruments of national power. Competition may include diplomatic and economic activities, countering political subversion, intelligence and counterintelligence activities, cyberspace operations, space operations, operations in the information environment, special operations, and other nonlethal activities. These actions are typically nonviolent and conducted under greater legal or policy constraints. Concurrent with competition, state forces or non-state actors may provide support to an insurgency, counterinsurgency, or resistance movement.

(c) The methods employed in competition vary with the situation, but successful action features several characteristics. First, the joint force begins with the best possible understanding of the relevant actors and how they will perceive the action. To have tangible effects on an adversary’s behavior, it is essential to understand their perceptions and decision making. Second, the joint force and its partners conduct a broad array of activities—dynamic force employment, establish access to critical areas, forward position units, establish an appropriate and timely presence, organize exercises, share intelligence, prepare the OE for a response to a contingency, and conduct operations in the information environment. Third, the joint force and its partners plan and execute creative and flexible competitive activities. Fourth, as the adversary’s intentions and capabilities change over time, the joint force conducts continual assessment. Finally, in comparison with armed conflict, competition uses indirect, rather than direct, military power. This often requires the close alignment of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts.

(d) The enduring nature of competition poses unique challenges for the consolidation of strategic objectives. Local successes rarely mean the end of the larger competition and few gains are reliably permanent. In this context, consolidation is an ongoing effort to protect and advance national interests and position the joint force for the next evolution of competition.

(e) Competition reflects a choice by the USG to pursue policy objectives while constraining military actions short of armed conflict. Though this competition is typically against an adversary that has also resolved to compete below armed conflict, the two competitors are rarely equal in willingness to commit resources and accept risk. Asymmetry is a defining feature of competition below armed conflict. When the adversary is willing to exert greater effort than the United States, the joint force seeks to limit the adversary’s gains.

(f) Competition and cooperation are in different forms of balance across an array of allies, partners, and adversaries. The United States competes with those with whom we cooperate and cooperates with competitors. This balance complicates planning and operations, since a single scenario may require the JFC to cooperate with multiple
partners spread across the competition continuum, some with whom we compete only economically and some who are nearly adversaries.

(3) Armed Conflict/War

(a) Armed conflict/war occurs when armed forces take actions against an enemy in hostilities or declared war. International law distinguishes armed conflict from disturbances (e.g., riots, violent protests) by the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties. In armed conflict, joint forces integrate capabilities to conduct combat operations and defeat the enemy’s capabilities, strategy, and will. In armed conflict, the use of violence is the primary means by which an actor seeks to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict varies in intensity and ranges from limited war to wars between great powers. The objective of armed conflict and waging war is to impose desired policy objectives upon the adversary.

(b) To win the nation’s wars, JFCs employ appropriate and necessary methods to defeat an enemy force in combat operations. Defeating an enemy means creating the conditions necessary to impose the desired strategic outcome on the enemy, against the enemy’s will to oppose or resist that outcome, through exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation. Exhaustion is the erosion of the enemy’s will. Attrition aims to disrupt, degrade, or neutralize an enemy’s armed forces or war-making capabilities over time, gradually reducing their strength or effectiveness. Annihilation is the destruction of the enemy’s means. It aims to fracture and eliminate the ability of an enemy’s armed forces to fight as a cohesive organization. Successful combat often involves a combination of all three mechanisms. When waging war from a position of disadvantage, attrition may be the appropriate mechanism for gaining time and space to increase combat power and seize the initiative. The weaker force may choose to exhaust an enemy’s will because it cannot win by destruction or attrition of the enemy’s armed forces or war-making capabilities.

e. Strategic Competition and Deterrence

(1) Deterrence applies during strategic competition, though in different forms according to the situation. Cooperation supports and strengthens deterrence. US cooperation with various allies and partners can serve as a deterrent of aggression by others. This cooperation ideally serves to deter subversion, coercion, or open aggression against the United States and potentially against others within the partnership or network through an understanding or perception of the potential negative implications of aggression.

(2) Deterrence in competition has a similar nuance but may be harder to judge. For instance, if an adversary supports a surrogate in a neighboring country, this is not proof that deterrence has failed. The adversary might have preferred to make an overt incursion but concluded the risks were too great. In that case, successful integrated deterrence of armed conflict led to competition. Perhaps the adversary intended to employ surrogates or partners, but successful intelligence and security cooperation between the United States and an ally cause them to conclude such operations would be fruitless, so they confined their actions to propaganda to discredit the United States. The act of competition may be the result of successful deterrence rather than its failure. In addition, as with armed conflict,
the joint force can deter future actions in competition by effectively responding to strategic challenges and crises. If the United States’ counter to an adversary’s use of surrogates or partners causes them to fail, then other adversaries might not resort to similar methods in the future.

(3) Successful integrated deterrence, across domains, functions, theaters, all instruments of national power, and international partners, whether against strategic or conventional attack, relies upon similar logic, but the stakes are different. Both of these missions depend on several critical functions. The first function is national leaders and commanders maintain real-time awareness of adversaries that can conduct strategic attacks. This awareness includes insight into their intentions and interests. Second, the CCDR should understand and identify preliminary and interim adversarial decisions. Third, deterrence requires developing and maintaining an understanding of an adversary’s calculations regarding the alternative actions, as well as its perception of the deterrent threat’s credibility and cost. Fourth, it requires the capability to influence the adversary’s values and perceptions. Fifth, deterrence requires knowing the limits of our actions on the adversary’s cost-benefit analysis. These limits change over time and vary among those adversaries who possess the capabilities of strategic attack. Some adversaries are difficult to influence, given the nature of their decision-making process, expectations of outcomes, and their analysis of the costs of denial or punishment.

f. Deterring Strategic Attack. Deterring strategic attack is a top defense priority of the United States. There is no conceptual or operational starting or stopping point for strategic deterrence—it is perpetual. Deterring strategic attack of any scale, either regionally or against the United States itself, is an essential and continuous aspect of campaigning. The primary purpose of US strategic deterrence is to prevent a nuclear attack on the United States and its allies, but this mission also includes dissuading nonnuclear strategic attacks in space and cyberspace and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum.

(1) JFCs orient the mission of deterring strategic attack on dissuading adversaries from conducting attacks that result in strategic effects, particularly on the homeland. Aligning and exercising all instruments of national power has become increasingly important as potential adversaries integrate their strategic military capabilities, expanding the range of potential challenges. This alignment is particularly true regarding threats of nuclear escalation and nonnuclear strategic attack.

(2) Achieving objectives within this mission relies on creating and sustaining the adversary’s perception that the costs of the US response would far outweigh the anticipated benefits of conducting a strategic attack. To be effective, the operations and activities associated with deterring strategic attack must influence an adversary’s decision making. Considering religious, social, cultural, linguistic, and psychological factors is essential to avoid mirroring (assuming adversaries share our experiences, perceptions, and analysis) and to understand an adversary’s actual perspective and its perception of our capabilities and resolve.

(3) JFCs can assure or discourage neutrals and partners from undesired operations, activities, and investments that increase risk by using different approaches than
that taken toward adversaries. Regardless of the ebb and flow of competition and uncertainty, JFCs maintain a credible ability to respond to a strategic attack and impose unacceptable costs on the attacker.

(4) The joint force’s pursuit of strategic deterrence is open-ended and enduring. In particular, all actions and operations against nuclear-armed adversaries must consider the risk of a failure of strategic deterrence.

g. Deterring Conventional Attack. JFCs deter adversaries from territorial aggression and conventional attack by signaling and demonstrating the threat of denial or punishment. This mission is a long-standing central theme and centerpiece of joint force responsibilities. To keep an adversary from miscalculating and acting on their ambitions, the objectives, operations, activities, and investments associated with deterring conventional attack are usually passive, credible, and overt in the signal of US commitment and resolve.

(1) The intent for deterring conventional attack is to prevent an adversary from considering armed conflict through the posturing of friendly capabilities and demonstrating the will to use them. The deterrence actions and signals purposefully place the initiative on an adversary to take the first aggressive actions. Deterrence by denial seeks to convince adversaries that an attack is so unlikely to succeed that it is not worth the attempt.

(2) Senior leadership can also deter through the threat of punishment by convincing adversaries that the effort required to accomplish their goals is so costly there would be no real victory or advantageous outcome. The traditional assumption is that US actions short of war can influence a rational adversary to maintain the status quo. Senior military and civilian leaders orient the operations and activities toward security and preparatory measures to protect US and allied interests, while signaling the capability and intent to respond to an adversary’s aggression. An aspect of deterrence by denial and punishment is resilience, such as the US nuclear triad and joint force support to partnership efforts to build their national resilience and total defense capability. With resilience, the United States seeks to convince adversaries that it has the ability to withstand losses and disruption.

(3) Once an adversary commits to pursuing objectives through armed conflict, then deterring that behavior may no longer be an option. Adversaries make decisions knowing full well the risks of war with the United States. If there is a window of opportunity to avert armed conflict after the enemy commits to initiating war, the opportunity is likely short.

(4) Deterrence continues during armed conflict. If deterrence fails and attacks occur, it is still possible to deter the attacker from expanding the war geographically, through space or cyberspace, or by using certain forms of weapons (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). In some cases, deterrence may fail because an adversary miscalculates US will or capability.
h. **Strategic Competition and Information.** The United States witnessed attempts by a foreign adversary, acting in cyberspace, to shape the 2016 Presidential election and, through lessons learned, reduced the effectiveness of similar efforts in the 2020 election. Against sophisticated adversaries, only the Armed Forces of the United States have the capability and authorities to effectively counter most malicious cyberspace activity. This problem will get worse. Adversaries have watched and learned how to distract, disrupt, and harm the economy and the functioning of US society. While most of the misinformation/disinformation efforts have so far focused on political or social issues, they are likely to move into economic disruption and other forms of nonlethal attack.

(1) The three tasks of the information joint function stress the requirement to incorporate information as a foundational element during the planning and conduct of all operations. The tasks are understanding how information impacts the OE, supporting human and automated decision making, and leveraging information. These tasks support all the other joint functions and provide commanders with the ability to understand how to attack, exploit, and manipulate information to achieve their objectives. Essential purposes include intelligence sharing, influence, creating effects in the information environment, and data sharing/interconnectivity. JFCs use the understand task of the information joint function to recognize and analyze the threats, opportunities, and vulnerabilities required to leverage information. Additionally, the understand task should identify access points and lines of influence that can be exploited through information activities to create effects and ultimately change behavior. This task also helps identify the operational signatures that require management or control to maintain essential secrecy. Operations security and military deception use that understanding to reveal or conceal those signatures to ensure relevant actors see what we want them to see and not see what we do not want them to see. The second task of the information joint function, support to human and automated decision making, is a critical prerequisite of joint operations. It enables joint forces to preserve and protect our ability (and our trust in that ability) to make sense of the information environment. All operations perform the third task of the information joint function, but leveraging information is the primary effort of information forces.

(2) Throughout strategic competition, JFCs integrates information into joint plans and synchronize information activities with other operations to influence desired behaviors, reinforce or increase combat power, and gain advantage in the information environment. Each joint operation has a unique strategic context, so the nature of information activities varies according to the distinct aspects of the mission and OE. JFCs may conduct operations in the information environment as an independent operation, but never in isolation, throughout all campaigns or operations and at any level of conflict.

(3) Cooperative use of information. During day-to-day activities, the joint force integrates information in operations by:

(a) Assuring and maintaining allies, widening/publicizing combined exercises and other partner nation cooperation activities, developing mutual trust, encouraging neutral actors that the joint force is the partner of choice or that they should remain neutral, and reminding partners of benefits to maintain their support.
(b) Informing enemies and adversaries of the potential benefits of friendly multinational force membership and collective defense, informing enemies and adversaries that the joint force is committed to its allies and security agreements, and concealing investment priorities and costs.

(c) Protecting the United States and allies from the harmful effects of misinformation and disinformation.

(4) Competitive use of information. During competition, the joint force conducts activities against state or non-state actors with incompatible interests that are below the level of armed conflict. Competition can include military operations, such as cyberspace operations, special operations, demonstrations of force, countering threat finance, and operations in the information environment. Additional time is often required to coordinate and obtain approval from DoD or other USG departments and agencies to use information due to increased risks.

(5) Exploiting informational weaknesses of the threat. JFCs can use information to undermine adversary activities, such as:

(a) Using information, including images, to expose adversaries illicit or malign activities, such as human rights abuses, to international and adversary civilian audiences or reveal funding sources of enemies.

(b) Exposing to their populace enemy decisions that resulted in significant loss of their resources, lives, and treasure.

(c) Increasing exploitation of adversary rifts, suspicions, or perceptions by publicizing enemy tactical failures, poor equipment readiness, inconsistent logistics, surrenders, populace skepticism, and other internal vulnerabilities that distract enemy leadership.

(d) Manipulating enemy messaging to confuse their leaders, supporters, allies, and partners.

(e) Conducting cyberspace operations to deny use of or erode confidence in enemy intelligence activities, which often depends on the ability to leverage the power of information through operations in the communication networks, information systems, or weapon systems.

(f) Disseminating messages to relevant enemy audiences to create or increase ambiguity.

(g) Conducting military deception in support of friendly operations to mislead adversaries or foreign intelligence about friendly capabilities, locations, methods, and timing.

(h) Conducting maneuver or fires that support military deception by targeting adversary communication, information, or weapon systems in support of feints,
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demonstrations, or ruses to create perceptions that a targeted area is a primary maneuver objective.

(i) Destroying or nullifying selected adversary intelligence collection capabilities.

(j) Conducting joint electromagnetic spectrum operations to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum via the employment of systems or weapons that use electromagnetic energy (e.g., jamming in the form of electromagnetic disruption, degradation, and deception).

(k) Employing systems or weapons that use radiated electromagnetic energy (to include directed energy) as their primary denial mechanism.

(l) Conducting signature management to support operations security, military deception, and offensive or defensive activities.

(m) Disseminating information that can reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral effects, and help to reduce military and civilian casualties.

(n) Recommending targets and providing support to enable USG departments and agencies to increase economic pressures. Examples include freezing enemy finance support, exposing threat finance transactions, exposing illegal arms trading, and exposing third-party financial and resource support to enemy activities.

i. Strategic Competition and Responding to Crises

(1) A crisis is an incident or emerging situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests. A crisis can develop rapidly and create a condition of such diplomatic, economic, public safety, or military importance that national leaders consider a commitment of military forces and resources. A crisis can occur anywhere across the competition continuum and the response can include almost any type of joint operation. The response may evolve into a limited contingency operation or even expand into large-scale combat operations. The joint force may respond to crises such as international and national humanitarian and natural disasters, deteriorating situations involving the safety of US citizens, or threats to allies or vital interests. JFCs may respond with lethal or nonlethal force as applicable and in compliance with rules of engagement. In responding to a crisis generated by an adversary’s provocations, the joint force may deploy forces to establish exclusion zones, enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions, or conduct strikes to respond to the adversary’s behavior.

(2) Where a crisis occurs along the competition continuum has little bearing on the scope, scale, or duration of a US response. For example, foreign humanitarian assistance can employ considerable resources and continue for months. Countering adversarial behavior can unfold on a massive scale. The joint force’s contribution to the 1961 Berlin Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were part of national mobilizations. The joint force’s deployments and changes in strategic posture were clear evidence of US commitment and resolve. Successful crisis response may require the ability to rapidly
deploy a fully capable joint force. If authorized by the President or SecDef, JFCs have the capability to conduct offensive operations with lethal or nonlethal force. Readiness is the key to a credible crisis response.

(3) There is always tension between succeeding in advancing and protecting US interests through cooperation and competition and setting favorable conditions in preparing for armed conflict. Joint force preparations for crisis response bolster deterrence by demonstrating US capability and will to succeed. With proper authorization, the joint force may respond to a crisis with types of lethal force normally associated with armed conflict. These strikes are typically punitive in nature and address a previous action. In circumstances where the situation is rapidly deteriorating, when armed conflict is imminent, or when irregular forces supported by adversaries threaten a nation’s sovereignty or regional stability, US forces may intervene to bolster internal defense, conduct offensive or defensive operations, or support stabilization efforts. A prompt crisis response may preclude escalation. Effective early intervention can also deny an enemy time to set conditions in their favor and achieve their objectives. Overall, the joint force can respond to a crisis in a broad or specific manner with a wide range of capabilities.

5. Campaigning

a. Campaigning is the persistent conduct and sequencing of military activities aligned with other instruments of national power to achieve prioritized objectives over time through global campaigns, CCMD campaigns, and associated families of contingency plans. CCDRs campaign to deter attacks, assure allies and partners, compete below armed conflict, prepare for and respond to threats, protect internationally agreed-upon norms, and, when armed conflict is necessary, prevail. CCDRs maneuver to gain military advantage by integrating and balancing these efforts across time and space and throughout the OE, which often requires cross-AOR coordination. Campaigning maintains or changes the OE to the favor of the United States, allies, and partners, while limiting, countering, and disrupting adversarial activities that challenge US interests below armed conflict. CCDRs campaign against the most consequential activities of a competitor that endanger our military advantage and national interests.

b. Successful campaigning begins with focused planning to achieve SecDef’s priorities as established in the strategic guidance. CCDRs campaign proactively through cooperation, competition, and armed conflict by using all means at their disposal. Campaigning improves understanding of the OE and seeks to influence perceptions by sowing doubt in our adversaries whether they can achieve their objectives or conduct coercive actions unnoticed or unchallenged. CCDRs may employ measures and overtures of assurance, persuasion, attraction, and mutual benefit or methods of coercion or intimidation.

c. Campaigning provides a range of options to oppose specific forms of coercion. Most adversaries strive to avoid armed conflict and accomplish their objectives at an acceptable level of risk and a relatively low opportunity cost. Their actions manifest as subversion, territorial encroachments, infringements of sovereignty, and violations of the rule of law that favor the adversary’s interests. In these situations, CCDRs maneuver to
contest and counter coercion and the adversary’s use of these malign or antagonistic operations, activities, and investments.

d. Emerging technologies are making these malign activities of adversarial competitors more effective and advantageous. CCDRs conduct defensive cyberspace operations to defeat competitors’ malicious cyberspace activity and prepare key terrain in cyberspace for armed conflict. CCDRs can tailor information activities to support or lead a specific response. Similarly, space operations are a pivotal tool for both the United States and its competitors.

e. CCDRs campaign to disrupt competitor advantages, reinforce US warfighting advantages, and enhance allied interoperability. In anticipation of armed conflict, CCDRs build and exercise force and basing requirements, including infrastructure, sustainment, C2, dispersal, and mobilization capacity, alongside allies and partners. CCDRs leverage security cooperation and capacity building with partners to take advantage of the deterrent value of the joint force. CCDRs employ intelligence collection, in concert with other USG departments and agencies, to provide warning intelligence.

f. Campaigning is the result of strategic direction, policy, and operational-level planning and execution. An effective and continual civilian-military dialogue guides the effort, ensuring integration between military operations within DoD and alignment with other USG departments and agencies. Campaigning in the pursuit of GCP and CCP objectives may occur over many years. The President and SecDef, with the advice of the CJCS and CCDRs, determine when the overall campaigning efforts require revision.

6. Joint Campaigns and Operations

a. The joint force continuously plans and conducts joint campaigns and operations to protect and promote the nation’s interests. The ability to fight and win in armed conflict against a variety of enemies is fundamental and joint warfighting remains paramount.

b. Joint Campaigns. A campaign is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Campaigns implement strategy and provide connectivity and continuity between the strategic and operational levels of warfare. Campaigns may be global, regional, or functional. Campaigns synchronize operations by providing operational objectives aligned with strategic objectives. Campaign assessment provides a continual feedback loop that informs policy and strategy.

c. The JSCP provides strategic guidance, integrates resources, identifies risks, and balances capabilities between campaign and contingency plans. This balancing effort ensures global campaigns and their associated contingencies link with each other. The JSCP also directs contingency planning consistent with the current contingency planning guidance. It expands on the contingency planning guidance with specific objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency plans. Additionally, the JSCP directs support plans to foster joint force collaboration and coordination. A coordinating authority oversees planning between multiple CCDRs. As campaign plans support enduring
requirements, contingency plans support operations that react to crisis scenarios, catastrophic events, and other contingency missions. Campaign and contingency plans are not prepared or executed in isolation. Campaign plans in competition and cooperation develop the integrated deterrence, assurance, and support activities that attempt to prevent contingencies from happening and establish conditions to respond should deterrence fail.

d. There are four types of campaign plans—GCPs, FCPs, RCPs, and CCPs.

(1) GCPs are an integral part of the Joint Strategic Planning System and the primary means by which the CJCS or designated CCDR achieves unity of effort for the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across CCMD AORs. The Joint Staff develops and maintains the GCPs for SecDef approval. GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning on a global or transregional basis. The JSCP identifies GCPs based on guidance in the NDS and NMS. GCPs are the centerpiece of global integration. Within these global campaigns, CCDRs can synchronize and integrate operations through mutually supporting broad missions that describe the principal orientation of the joint force and the way it can operate and maneuver around the globe, in multiple AORs, against the same threat. CCDRs can organize in mission areas. Examples are deterring strategic attack, deterring conventional attack, assuring allies and partners, competing below armed conflict, and preparing for/responding to threats.

(2) FCPs address functional threats or challenges not bound by AORs yet requiring coordination across multiple CCMDs. The CJCS can direct FCP planning through the JSCP or a planning order to CCMDs.

(3) RCPs address regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple AORs. Generally, issues that require RCPs require attention to ensure they do not devolve into a significant crisis. If necessary, SecDef, through the CJCS, could direct an RCP with a designated coordinating authority.

(4) The CCPs are the primary means through which the CCMDs collaboratively develop operations, activities, and investments within their Unified Command Plan-assigned missions/AOR. The CCPs orient on functional/regional objectives and include multiple operations and activities over a specified time and OA. CCPs provide direction for all CCMD-level operations that counter adversaries and set conditions in the OE that enable follow-on action.

e. Campaign plans and joint operations are under the authority that US law provides to CCDRs. CCDRs and subordinate commanders use intelligence products and analyses from across the joint, interagency, and multinational partners to understand the OE. CCDRs and subordinate commanders use assigned and attached forces to shape the OE, compete against or deter adversaries, defend our vital interests, and coerce or force competitors or adversaries to change their course of action. In accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 165, Military Department Secretaries are responsible for the administrative and logistic support of Service forces and joint organizations, as designated by SecDef.
f. **Operations.** A specific operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Most joint operations incorporate elements of all domains. Joint operations may also be global and transregional. In armed conflict, an operation can be a sequence of tactical battles and engagements. An operation may entail combat operations, stabilization activities, operations in the information environment, or the employment of capabilities in competition to achieve an objective. A major operation is a series of tactical actions conducted by combat forces, and coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an OA.

*For more information on the legal authority of CCDRs, see Title 10, USC, Sections 164, 165, and 167.*

*For more information on the roles and functions of DoD and its major components, see Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.*

g. JFCs seek to create a series of dilemmas for their adversaries. One approach is for JFCs to apply their strengths against enemy critical vulnerabilities, without exposing their forces’ critical vulnerabilities. The intent is for JFCs to create synergy through effective employment of joint functions with a tempo the enemy cannot match or sustain. The goal is an opponent whose cohesion, effective command capability, and capacity to respond is insufficient to prevent JFCs success.

7. **Joint Functions**

   a. Joint functions are a grouping of capabilities and activities that enable JFCs to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each joint function. Some tasks and systems apply to more than one joint function.

   b. There are seven joint functions common to joint operations—C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Commanders leverage the capabilities of multiple joint functions during operations. The joint functions apply to all joint operations across the competition continuum. The integration of activities across joint functions to accomplish tasks and missions occurs at all levels of command.

   c. Essential to mission accomplishment, joint functions reinforce and complement one another. For example, joint fires can enhance the protection of a joint security area by dispersing or disrupting enemy assets that threaten it. The JFC uses military capabilities to perform tasks associated with each joint function. Individual Service capabilities often support multiple joint functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single operation, battle, or activity. The JFC uses military capabilities to perform tasks associated with each joint function.

   d. JFCs and interagency partners coordinate and align military operations with the activities of interorganizational participants to achieve unity of effort. Commercial support has significant potential to support military operations, and the joint force may leverage commercial capabilities to execute joint functions. JFCs must assess and manage the risk
associated with using commercial capabilities using DoD guidance and recognize that their component commanders are responsible for the appropriate, efficient, and effective acquisition of contracted services for military operations.

e. The C2 joint function encompasses the exercise of authority, responsibility, and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish a mission. Command is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Control, which is inherent in command, manages and directs forces and functions consistent with a commander’s command authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts.

f. The information joint function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action, or inaction and to support human and automated decision making. Therefore, JFCs attack and exploit adversary information. The information joint function helps commanders and staffs understand the narrative and anticipate and leverage information in all military operations. Information expands the JFCs’ range of options for action across the competition continuum. The application of informational power may be the primary option available to a JFC during long-duration cooperation and competition below armed conflict, where the use of physical force is inappropriate or restricted.

g. The intelligence joint function supports the JFC’s ability to understand the OE and the motives and calculus of adversaries and other relevant actors, to enable informed decision making and development of effective plans and actions. Joint intelligence personnel analyze relevant aspects of the OE and produce intelligence assessments on a continuing basis to support the commander in creating and/or exploiting opportunities. Intelligence also provides analyses that enable the JFC to gain the advantage by getting inside the decision cycle of an enemy, adversary, or other relevant actor.

h. Fires is the use of weapon systems or other actions to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to create desired effects in support of a common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects. However, other capabilities that can create nonlethal effects, such as operations in the electromagnetic environment, in cyberspace, and in space; intermediate force capabilities; or information activities, may create denial effects with little or no physical destruction.

i. Movement and maneuver encompass the geographic or spatial disposition of joint commands or forces to conduct operations by securing positional advantage. This joint function includes the projection of force and maneuvering that force to the tactical position or operational depth necessary to achieve objectives. Commanders use movement and maneuver to choose where and when to engage an enemy or take best advantage of geographic, astrographic, environmental, and other conditions.
The protection joint function focuses on preserving the joint force’s fighting potential. The protection function encompasses force protection, force health protection, and other protection activities.

(1) Force protection includes security and defensive measures that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications from an enemy’s attack. These actions include passive defensive measures that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy, as well as technology and procedures that reduce the risk of friendly fire incidents.

(2) Force health protection complements force protection efforts by promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the mental or physical well-being of Service members. Force health protection provides the JFC freedom of action with effective biosurveillance and medical countermeasures to mitigate evolving global health threats.

(3) Other protection activities may extend beyond force protection to encompass protection of US civilians and US critical infrastructure, points of embarkation in the homeland and points of debarkation in the forward areas, the civil infrastructure of friendly nations, and our interorganizational partners. Another protection function is the mission assurance construct, which is the commander’s process to protect or ensure the resilience of capabilities and assets.

For more information, see DoDD 3000.03E, DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.

(4) Global health engagement improves the health and medical readiness of our global force and enhances health security. The US military has a long-standing history in international public health issues because of our responsibility to protect the health of our warfighters and to prevent the spread of disease internationally. Global health engagement expands our medical readiness, builds trust with international medical partners, deepens professional medical relationships around the world, and advances both international and US national security objectives by mitigating global health threats and improving international health capabilities.

See DoD Instruction 2000.30, Global Health Engagement (GHE) Activities, for more information.

k. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, personnel, and health services necessary to maintain operations from deployment, through mission accomplishment, to redeployment of the force. Effective sustainment provides the JFC the means to enable freedom of action, endurance, and operational reach necessary to conduct operations. Joint logistics and personnel support sustain readiness for joint forces.

8. Joint Planning

a. Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve the objectives (the ends). In other words, joint planning links the military instrument of national power to the
achievement of national security objectives and transforms national strategic objectives into operational objectives, operational design and approaches, lines of operation and effort, and tactical tasks and activities. Planners ensure that interagency, interorganizational, and multinational partners’ requirements inform military plans.

b. Ideally, joint planning begins with specified strategic objectives that are realistic and achievable. These objectives provide a unifying purpose for joint force actions and the prioritization of its resources. Joint planning provides a common framework for discussion and understanding for JFCs, allies and other foreign partners, interorganizational partners, and strategic leadership. Effective joint planning provides options that offer the highest probability of success at an acceptable risk. Such options account for the efficient use of limited time and resources. When our understanding of the OE is still evolving and specific strategic objectives are still emerging, planners identify options with a range of possible outcomes. Joint planning enables rapid updates and adaptations in policy, strategic guidance, and resources, as the situation requires. Joint planning also identifies capabilities and authorities outside of DoD necessary to achieve military objectives and satisfy interagency and interorganizational requirements.

c. Joint planning addresses global challenges that require multiple CCMDs to work together. Joint planning aids JFC synchronization of resources and integration of timelines, decision points, and authorities across CCMDs to achieve strategic objectives. This integration produces a shared understanding of the OE, required decisions, resource prioritization, and risk across CCMD AORs and functional responsibilities. The understanding created during joint planning enables the CJCS and CCDRs to develop global and transregional strategic plans. This information also helps CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs and staffs to anticipate situations and act rapidly.

d. The joint planning process requires the assessment and mitigation of risk. In the course of developing options, JFCs, as well as the larger joint planning and execution community, identify and communicate shortfalls in their ability to resource and execute military operations. They also propose potential options to reduce or mitigate risk. There is always risk, but JFCs can mitigate and manage that risk through planning, preparation, and constant assessment.

For more information, refer to CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis Methodology.

e. Assessment is an essential process that enables continual adjustment of the planning and execution of campaigns and operations. Operations assessment examines both the joint force’s performance and effectiveness toward creating desirable conditions and the achievement of objectives within the OE. Commanders lead operations assessments and are key to identifying emergent risks and opportunities.

f. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of policies, strategies, campaigns, operations, and activities to determine effectiveness. Formal assessments enable JFCs to methodically identify and analyze changes and trends in the environments. Assessments recommend actions for staff to improve processes or mitigate regression.
g. Assessment is inexact and often results in hypotheses that require testing. Assessment teams must perform evaluations and provide recommendations based on incomplete and possibly contradictory information.
CHAPTER IV
ADVANCED DOCTRINAL CONCEPTS

1. Overview

Our adversaries present the joint force with dilemmas that extend beyond typical OAs; transcend CCMD AORs; and exist within the domains of land, maritime, air, and space and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Armed conflict with a peer adversary may quickly spread beyond the original OA. Commanders must comprehend quickly the global and regional aspects of the situation within an evolving OE, counter the actions of adversaries, and work together to seize the initiative across multiple regions, all while assessing operational and strategic risk. Against a threat with global reach and strategic depth, the philosophy of a single-supported CCMD or joint force organized around an AOR-specific concept of operations may be appropriate in some instances but in others could constrain effective joint warfighting in a way that does not address the global problem. Senior leaders across DoD recognize this change in the character of war and are shifting, when necessary, from regional to global perspectives.

2. Global Concept of Operations

a. A global concept of operations achieves global effects through the integration of CCMD-level missions in all domains and multiple AORs in a unified effort. Multiple supported and supporting CCDRs execute these operations based on SecDef prioritization of efforts between CCMDs. CCDRs employ forces globally to arrange cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose to overwhelm the enemy.

b. The Joint Staff, in its statutory role as the military staff supporting the CJCS, facilitates the development of a global concept of operations by gaining and synthesizing the perspectives of the CCMDs, Services, and National Guard Bureau. While the CCMDs delegated with coordinating authority for a problem set may best understand the threat, the adversary’s decision calculus, and the impact on regional partners, the Joint Staff may better appreciate the global situation.

c. CCDRs develop and consider an array of alternative approaches to address changes in the OE. The CCMDs, Services, National Guard Bureau, and the Joint Staff all contribute to the process and depend on each other’s analysis and expertise. To help SecDef determine the best approach, the CCMDs provide their estimates and recommendations of how they could best contribute to each alternative. The Joint Staff synthesizes their input, addresses strategic risk, and recommends an overall operational approach in support of the CJCS’s Title 10, USC, function of “preparing strategic plans” to “guide the use and employment of the joint force.” The Joint Staff proposes the operational approach to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in concert with the CCMDs’ estimates, recommendations, prioritizations, and characterizations of risk.

d. Prioritization among multiple, simultaneously supported CCMDs is a dynamic process that requires analysis between supporting and supported CCMDs. This analysis includes the capabilities required, objectives, and targeting, as well as initial and residual
risk to enable the CJCS to advise SecDef on priorities. The Joint Staff develops an understanding of each CCMD’s unique capabilities and limitations. The Joint Staff translates their understanding into CCMD tasks that are mutually complementary. Then the Joint Staff helps the CJCS visualize the global concept of operations and identifies the unique authorities, posture, and conditions that enable each CCMD to optimize its contribution. As the threat and OE evolve, the CJCS advises SecDef on matters of strategic guidance and prioritization for implementation.

3. Coordinating Global Effects

   a. Armed conflict may require multiple and overlapping support relationships. These relationships enable the coordination of global forces in time and tempo across multiple regions and domains to achieve campaign objectives. CCDRs use a global coordination process to ensure an appreciation of out-of-AOR threats and the capability to coordinate and integrate global capabilities, fires, operations, and information to facilitate global effects. The inputs of global effects coordination among CCMDs via global battle rhythm working groups feed the CJCS military advice to the President and SecDef. The outputs of the coordination of operations and effects feed the strategic guidance published by SecDef to the CCMDs.

   b. Global effects coordination focuses primarily on integration between the CCMDs and prioritizes lethal and nonlethal global effects. The global effects coordination process seeks to improve situational awareness across CCMD theater and functional responsibilities; identifies opportunities, tensions, and consequences of action or inaction; assesses effects of multiple CCMD efforts across time (e.g., how the deterrent effect of one CCMD’s actions made the use of information in another CCMD’s AOR more effective); and aligns CCMD operations to generate desired effects. To meet global campaign objectives and provide coordination of global effects, CCMDs synchronize and deconflict diverse capabilities of the joint force across the globe through multi-CCMD coordination working groups. SecDef-designated support relationships between commanders define the roles and responsibilities for global effects planning and execution. Supported CCDRs provide fire support requirements for their AOR to the supporting CCDRs. The supporting CCDRs, given their unique capabilities and expertise with those systems, may have competing views and objectives for the most effective use of those limited resources and may require the advice of the CJCS as global integrator to establish priorities and arrange actions as a cohesive whole. SecDef guidance and prioritization takes precedence over any competing subordinate views.

   c. The global effects coordination process within established support relationships enables the Joint Staff and the CCDRs to continually assess and make recommendations for out-of-AOR targets on the global integrated target list. Based on the strategic guidance promulgated by SecDef, the supporting CCMDs prosecute those targets relative to their own prioritized target lists. For targets within a supported CCDR’s AOR, the joint fires element makes global fires requests to supporting CCDRs. In cases where global fires have limited scope, the Joint Staff, in coordination with appropriate CCDRs, makes recommendations to the CJCS and SecDef regarding their most effective employment and
prioritization. The recommendations and prosecution of global effects seek to optimize the effectiveness of global fires while mitigating the risk to friendly forces.

d. Establishing global fire support requirements and coordinating fire support between CCMDs requires a great deal of collaboration and coordination. Effective collaboration between transregional responsibilities occurs through organizational processes that include elements, functional boards, and planning teams of representatives from across the CCMDs. Some degree of synchronization is always necessary at the operational level to align movement, maneuver, and fires with the desired effects.

e. Commanders and their planners identify the types and timing of required lethal and nonlethal effects and the associated actions early in the targeting and planning processes and continuously thereafter. Planning guidance and commander’s intent provide direction for the integration of effects at the operational level, while leaving detailed execution of actions to subordinate tactical units.

f. Coordination between the staffs of CCDRs is key to providing global situational awareness between all CCMDs. This situational awareness is essential to facilitating the integration of global operations at the lowest echelon possible. Global battle rhythm meetings enable CCMD operations staffs to understand the common strategic guidance and how multiple supported CCMDs prioritize their resources. Staffs make recommendations for synchronizing operations across the globe that span multiple AORs and all domains.

4. Multiple Supported Commands

a. The integration of the joint force on a global basis requires multiple supported and supporting CCDRs. The joint force campaigns as a globally integrated force. Campaigning may require the integration of the full range of capabilities in multiple AORs and domains, each with a unique set of supporting commanders. Together with timely strategic guidance from SecDef and unity of effort, globally integrated C2 increases the ability of CCDRs to successfully integrate many capabilities and improve the effectiveness of their campaigns and major operations.

b. Support Relationships for a Supported CCDR in a Single AOR. SecDef establishes support relationships between the CCDRs for the execution of joint campaigns and operations in competition and armed conflict. This clarity ensures the supported CCDR receives all necessary support. The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of the assigned mission(s), as well as the priority, effects, and timing of maneuver and fires. Supporting CCDRs assist a supported CCDR within the guidelines and priorities established in strategic guidance. A supported CCDR requests capabilities from supporting DoD components, coordinates with the appropriate USG departments and agencies (where there are current agreements), and develops a plan to achieve the objectives. As part of the effort, supporting CCDRs provide the requested capabilities, as available, to assist the supported CCDR to accomplish missions.

c. Transregional Responsibilities. Several CCMDs are the standing supported commands for specified global missions. A warning order, planning order, or execute
order to address a change in the OE within or across multiple AORs does not change or diminish their global responsibilities or functions. CCDRs with transregional missions balance their efforts between their global responsibilities and their support to other CCDRs. These CCMDs anticipate serving simultaneously as supported and supporting commands in execution of a global concept of operations. Their challenge, while minimizing risk to mission, is to determine how best to maintain their global mission while effectively supporting other supported CCDRs and minimizing risk to all efforts.

d. **Multiple Supported CCDRs in Multiple AORs**

(1) Under some circumstances, a CCDR may simultaneously be a supporting commander for one operation while being a supported commander for another. SecDef strategic guidance drives the CCDR’s prioritization in these cases. One example is homeland defense, where unity of effort is essential. A supported CCMD for one mission conducts operations and activities within its own AOR to support another CCDR’s mission to protect the homeland. Another example is a supporting CCMD with transregional responsibilities that conducts operations within a supported CCMD’s AOR. A third example is Commander, United States Space Command, requesting another CCMD create effects in support of space activities to ensure the former’s ability to provide space capabilities to a third command.

(2) Campaigning may require multiple overlapping missions executed by multiple commands. The more capable the threat, the more complex the relationships between CCMDs. CCDRs with broad transregional responsibilities may be the supported CCDRs for portions of their mission. In addition, those CCDRs may have strategic guidance to support other CCDRs for aspects of a different mission. The supported CCDRs ensure the supporting CCDRs understand the requirements and works to coordinate the required supporting actions. In every case, the supported commander has the responsibility to synchronize operations from other CCDRs. As previously described, the CCDRs with both transregional and supporting roles prioritize their capabilities, effort, and time based on SecDef guidance as they execute both missions simultaneously. When necessary, this requires the Joint Staff to prioritize requirements and enables the CJCS to make informed recommendations to SecDef.

(3) These multiple supported and supporting command relationships enable synergy between the supported CCDRs to execute broad actions, such as a counteroffensive or forcing the culmination of an enemy offensive by concentrating effects in one OA or creating effects in multiple AORs. In concert, the supported CCDR executes reciprocal supporting actions simultaneously to enable the missions of CCDRs’ operations unfolding in other AORs. This reciprocating support is not a one-time occurrence but likely a continuing cycle in attacking and adapting to the enemy. As operational requirements expand, there may be multiple supported and supporting CCDRs. For the practice of global integration and joint operations across all domains, these global concepts of operations are not only becoming normal but a necessity.
5. Military Support to Countering Coercion and Malign Influence

a. Adversaries seek leverage and influence over other nations and geographic regions. They prefer to avoid war with the United States and achieve their objectives at an acceptable level of risk and a relatively low opportunity cost. Their actions manifest as territorial encroachments, infringements of sovereignty, and violations of the rule of law that favor the adversary’s interests. In some cases, these encroachments seek to influence and control the internal domestic policy decisions of another country without having to seize or occupy parts of it. With appropriate authorization, JFCs can counter adversarial actions and malign influence through demonstration, regional repositioning, air and maritime interception operations, global deployments, strengthening and reinforcing allies and partners, countering malicious cyberspace activities, establishing exclusion zones, enforcing sanctions, information activities, and freedom of navigation operations at sea and in the air.

(1) Through joint campaigns and operations, JFCs can help specific allies and partners defend their own sovereignty and territorial integrity and build resilience against adversary coercion and subversion.

(2) JFCs can conduct IW operations and activities to deny adversaries their objectives by eroding their power, influence, and political will; creating dilemmas for them; and imposing costs.

(3) When directed by the President or SecDef, joint forces use capabilities that create nonlethal or lethal effects (e.g., nonlethal directed energy, cyberspace operations, information activities, and electromagnetic warfare).

b. Countering coercion is not deterrence reimagined, nor is it preparation or prelude to armed conflict. Competition below armed conflict can be its own unique, challenging, and indefinite contest for influence, advantage, and leverage, where many aspects of malign influence and antagonistic behavior are undeterrable. Within all the global campaigns, JFCs competing below the level of armed conflict seek to proactively limit, counter, or even de-construct these coercive encroachments and their harmful effects. In competition below armed conflict, JFCs maneuver to support broader US efforts to contest and counter coercion and adversaries’ use of malicious or antagonistic operations, activities, and investments that encroach on US sovereignty or fall outside of international treaties and norms. Through competition, revisionist states and rogue regimes use coercive and subversive measures to change the environment in their favor. These approaches are deliberate alternatives to armed conflict. Activities associated with competition provide an alternative approach without armed conflict for countering our adversaries’ use of malicious or antagonistic activities intended to degrade US legitimacy, credibility, influence, economic power, and national security. Senior military leaders must recognize these approaches and alternative uses of force short of war, to include working with DOS and other USG departments and agencies in a concerted and coordinated effort to compete effectively.
c. Determining the Approach and Objectives for a Specific Interest/Adversarial Behavior

(1) In developing an approach, senior civilian and military leaders have to make six determinations.

(a) What to demand of the adversary regarding curtailment of the encroachment.

(b) What measures will be effective against the adversary’s existing encroachment and convey relevant and increasing costs for continued noncompliance.

(c) How to create a sense of necessity for the adversary to comply with the demand.

(d) How to signal or communicate an assurance of settlement when the adversary complies.

(e) How to assess whether the implemented approach is working.

(f) The gravity and commitment of following through on the threat if the adversary fails to comply.

(2) Together, these six determinations lead to an approach that is credible and potent enough in the adversary’s mind that they choose compliance rather than noncompliance and its consequences.

(3) The more far-reaching the demand on the adversary, the stronger its motivation to resist, making the task more difficult. JFCs strive to know and anticipate the adversary and avoid the tendency to mirror how we might react given a reversal of roles.

See JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations, and JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations, for more information.

6. Global Perspective for Responding to Crises

a. A change in the OE might be caused by things like a natural disaster, a mass atrocity, a change in an adversary’s subtle encroachment posing far-reaching consequences, or an unanticipated violent act of aggression with limited impact. A change can occur anywhere, in any condition, and the shift in strategic guidance and response can include almost any type of joint operation. The response to an incident or emerging situation surrounding a threat to the United States or its vital interests can also take many forms. The response may evolve into a limited contingency operation or even expand into large-scale combat operations.

b. To support leadership decision making in a crisis, the JSCP directs the Joint Staff to lead development of SPF s. These serve as the primary branch planning constructs for key GCPs and provide direction for all CCMD contingency plans associated with each
priority problem set. SPFs enable integration of plans by establishing a shared understanding of the problem, developing a common set of military objectives, articulating a strategic approach, and providing resourcing guidance for concurrent plans. The SPFs also provide options across the CCMDs and a framework to assist in those decisions.

c. Upon recognizing a change in the strategic environment or OE that threatens US interests, the intelligence community, NSC, Office of the Secretary of Defense, other USG departments and agencies, the CJCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CCMDs contemplate the gravity of the change. They seek to understand the implications and respond with a range of potential options and policy decisions for national leaders to consider, using the SPFs as a starting point. Ultimately, the President or SecDef will determine the option and decide. In parallel, the Joint Staff and CCMDs conduct analysis and planning to address whether the current SPF and GCP can accommodate the change. If they are insufficient, then the recommended choices are:

1. To take no additional action and accept the risk,
2. Expand resources and authorities of the CCDRs’ CCPs,
3. Transition to one or more of the problem sets’ integrated contingency plans, or
4. Implement a revised or variant of an integrated contingency plan appropriate to the actual circumstances.

d. Ultimately, leadership determines the value of the contested interest and object in question. National decision making in complex situations is often very iterative and time-compressed.

e. The CJCS may opt to transmit an alert order, warning order, or planning order to alert and provide top-down planning guidance to the joint force to respond to and inform the iterative national decision making. Often, these types of orders request broad options in the form of commander’s estimates to inform military advice to SecDef and the NSC on a range of potential options as part of a whole-of-government (and governments) approach. The CJCS may opt to designate multiple supported commanders for planning, based on the nature of the threat, to better frame options. These supported commanders for planning may transition to supported commanders in execution (aligning to the idea of who plans, executes).

f. Actual circumstances rarely conform to all the prior assumptions and estimates of a deliberate plan. In most cases, CCDRs form their initial recommendations based on intelligence, their estimates, the Joint Staff’s synthesis, recommended approach, and risk assessments. As senior military leaders come to their conclusions, they begin to form recommendations, which likely include simultaneous efforts of multiple CCMDs across multiple AORs, functions, and all domains.
CHAPTER V
THE PRACTICE OF JOINT WARFIGHTING

1. Introduction

a. Armed conflict/war characterizes a strategic relationship surrounding an interest or set of interests where adversaries use lethal force as the primary means for imposing their will and achieving their objectives. The continuous employment of lethal force is a defining aspect of war and is a reflection of substantial resolve and commitment to an interest which the United States values greatly. Joint warfighting is a function of this resolve, employing various means in multiple AORs. Joint warfighting’s effects are most visible in the physical domains. However, creating effects in the information environment by attacking, exploiting and manipulation in cyberspace; conducting other targeted information activities; and creating effects in and through the electromagnetic spectrum are equally important. Along with other instruments of national power, effective joint warfighting influences the adversary’s choices, decision making, will to fight, and behavior.

b. A key component of joint warfighting is avoiding enemy strengths and surviving their attacks, while simultaneously creating and exploiting weaknesses and vulnerabilities through multiple cycles of offensives, counteroffensives, and transitions. The transitions may temporarily emphasize defensive operations at the operational or strategic level. Throughout the conduct of joint warfighting, JFCs confront and endure surprise and failure while minimizing, where possible, inconclusive actions or periods of stalemate. Armed conflict continues until one side begins to adapt and adjust to the OE more quickly, realizing increasing advantages. JFCs press and exploit these opportunities to maintain and expand these advantages. As JFCs’ offensive operations begin defeating the enemy militarily through combinations of attrition, exhaustion, and destruction, the United States can bring to bear other instruments of national power effectively. Defeating the enemy militarily is necessary but may be insufficient to achieve strategic objectives without effective integration of the other instruments of national power. JFCs either impose increasing levels of costs or support negotiations toward a settlement, but making the success enduring requires JFCs to continue campaigning.

c. To influence the adversary’s behaviors and establish conditions to achieve objectives, JFCs expect to continue campaigning long past the cessation of sustained hostilities. Throughout the transitions that follow armed conflict, JFCs recognize opportunities to cooperate with new partners and requirements to counter or coerce new and old adversaries in new and recharacterized competitions that seek to provide the United States a favorable advantage. JFCs must maintain the preparedness to employ force short of armed conflict or occasional episodes of violent action to secure and perpetuate gains.

2. Posturing for Armed Conflict

a. The transition to armed conflict can present significant challenges for the joint force. Defeating an enemy requires civilian leaders and commanders to transition the force optimized for the global campaigns to a disposition for armed conflict. Additionally,
CCDRs do not assume they will receive abundant warning time and focus proactively on preparedness for armed conflict.

b. Joint warfighting can be a complex, extensive, and comprehensive effort. CCDRs synchronize their campaigns’ operations and activities with other CCDRs across multiple AORs, all-domains, and functions to defeat the enemy’s will, strategy, and capabilities. The adversary may employ strategic attacks, coercion, irregular tactics, terrorism, criminal activity, and information activities to complicate operations. In this OE, CCDRs adapt continually to evolving situations, opportunities presented by the enemy, lessons learned, and changes in available forces and capabilities.

c. In addition to optimizing nuclear and conventional posture and readiness, JFCs prepare for armed conflict by conducting operational preparation of the environment activities to develop knowledge of the OE; establish human, physical, or virtual infrastructure; and develop potential targets. Operational preparation of the environment includes active and passive observation, reconnaissance, and surveillance; area and network familiarization; site surveys; developing operational capability; prepositioning logistics; mapping the information environment; and mission rehearsals.

d. **Types of Transition.** There are several methods to transition from competition to armed conflict/war.

   (1) **Adapting Contingency Plan Execution.** Contingency plans address an anticipated, demanding scenario. If an approved contingency plan closely resembles the emergent scenario, leaders can refine or adapt that plan as necessary for execution. Realizing the connections between a developing crisis and an existing plan speeds plan updates, eases the transition, and minimizes the time required to revisit the issues that arose during the initial plan development. The planning team updates the plan for the current conditions.

   (2) **Contingency Plan Modification.** When the contingency plans are associated with a global integration framework, initial planning may identify decisions that require the reallocation of military forces. These forces may reposition from across the globe to meet the contingency execution requirements. The reallocation impacts executing the contingency plan along with the ongoing GCPs. Even with this preparation, all CCDRs and their planners assess the risk associated with changes to ongoing global campaign activities and ensure that DoD senior military and civilian leadership recognizes the opportunity costs. The CJCS provides for the preparation and review of contingency plans, which conform to policy guidance. In this process, the CJCS may recommend to SecDef and the President changes necessary to ongoing operations, activities, and investments and prepare orders directing the movement of forces.

   (3) **Planning to Execution.** JFCs and staffs conduct planning in-stride as an emergent situation arises. The planning team analyzes approved contingency plans with like scenarios to determine if an existing plan applies. If a contingency plan is appropriate to the situation, SecDef can direct execution and tailor unique authorizations through an execute order or fragmentary order to initiate movement. In a contingency, planning
usually transitions rapidly to execution, so there is limited deviation between the plan and initial execution. JFCs assist the planning through their planning expertise and knowledge gained in other situations and from the OE during similar planning efforts.

e. Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing resources to win a war. Mobilization includes assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the Reserve Component (including federalizing the National Guard), extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a higher state of readiness.

(1) JFCs review the mobilization implications associated with their plans to ensure needed resources are identified, mobilized, protected, and used effectively. Civilian and military leaders identify requirements for activating Reserve Component forces and applicable activation authorities, in a timely manner, as well as the need to expand the capability or capacity of other resource areas.

(2) Timely mobilization and subsequent deployment of resources is essential for JFCs to overwhelm the adversary at the right time and place.

f. Sustaining the force. JFC’s provision for logistics and personnel services are required to maintain continuous combat operations for as long as required. Mobilization planning is critical to ensuring logistics sustainability. Sustainability provides the JFC flexibility, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach. To sustain operations, commanders must ensure personnel services, health services, field services, quality of life, and general supply support are adequate. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which JFCs can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

g. The security and effective operations of US critical infrastructure—including energy, banking and finance, transportation, communication, and the defense industrial base—are essential to mobilize, project, and sustain joint forces. JFCs integrate and synchronize a broad range of military activities to defend the homeland against aggression and attack. These activities include the defense of the domestic population, the critical infrastructure of the United States and its territories, and the domestic population and critical infrastructure of allies. JFCs’ primary homeland defense actions include active and passive measures to defeat threats already deployed or en route to a target. Active defenses employ defensive actions (e.g., defensive counterair) and offensive actions (e.g., counterattacks) to deny a contested area or position to the enemy. Active defenses reduce the effectiveness of or stop attacks on US sovereign territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure and key resources. Critical infrastructures include those assets, systems, networks, and functions—physical or virtual—so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on homeland physical security, national economic security, and public health or safety. Key resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to minimal operation of the economy and the government.
3. Joint Warfighting and the Challenges of Armed Conflict

   a. JFCs maintain a deterrent posture with forward-deployed forces and remain ready to defeat the enemy attack, overcome surprise, and recover from a loss of initiative. The adversary can employ a mix of irregular, conventional, and informational activities that may not present a triggering event until their operation or campaign is well underway. An adversary may leverage nonmilitary aspects of power with covert, clandestine, and coercive activities to confound warning intelligence. JFCs require continually updated, relevant, and timely warning intelligence to determine whether an attack is imminent or underway. JFCs could simultaneously combat forms of enemy IW while countering misinformation, propaganda, and deception.

   b. JFCs protect their forces and maintain the ability to respond to the enemy’s initial attack. Forward-deployed forces and survivable infrastructure challenge the viability of the enemy’s approach. Enemy antiaccess capabilities limit the joint force’s flexibility to initiate the offensive and can interdict forces entering an OA. These enemy systems may provide multiple layers of standoff defenses that deny the joint force access to the OA. The successful penetration of the outer layer of antiaccess systems is just a first step for JFCs.

   c. Initially, JFCs attack, manipulate, and exploit the enemy’s information. Subsequent operations may require JFCs to create localized areas of domain superiority and temporary avenues of approach to attack critical high-payoff and vulnerable antiaccess means, such as C2, cyberspace, space, air, and maritime interconnectivity and systems. To neutralize the enemy’s multi-layered standoff capabilities, JFCs employ joint fires throughout multiple AORs. JFCs accomplish this by receiving targeting information for high-priority enemy information, C2, and long-range systems from orbital space, high-altitude surveillance or low-observable air platforms, and cyberspace. This information enables rapid strikes to eliminate and disrupt critical antiaccess/area denial capabilities and integrated air defense system assets. Joint fires may originate from various organizations and locations to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas and prevent their effective response. Successful attacks lead to greater access and opportunity.

   d. JFCs contest enemy attacks by imposing losses on the enemy to delay its objectives and prevent its consolidation of gains. Through reconnaissance and prepared defenses with forward-positioned forces, JFCs delay the enemy’s arrival of follow-on forces. JFCs employ joint fires, deception activities, and cyberspace operations to present the enemy with multiple dilemmas and prevent the massing of lethal effects on the joint force. The challenge for JFCs is that for a peer enemy, antiaccess enablers, such as C2, and intelligence (collection), surveillance, and reconnaissance, and targeting systems, may consist of confederated networks of military and civilian information, aviation, maritime, cyberspace, and space systems. Additionally, adversary space object surveillance and identification capabilities may include multiple sites spread throughout the world, using both military and civilian assets. Alternatively, friendly information, C2, and civilian airports and seaports are most likely to be the first areas an enemy targets.
e. Evolving situations may drive SecDef to shift efforts from one supported CCMD to another. JFCs organize forces to implement strategic direction and pursue campaign objectives. JFCs provide direction and guidance to subordinate commanders and establish command relationships in accordance with the OE to enable an effective span of control, responsiveness, tactical flexibility, and protection. JFCs have full authority, within established directives, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs task-organize their forces and allow Service, special operations, space, and cyberspace units to function as trained and organized. However, JFCs adapt C2 structure to changes in the OE.

f. JFCs attack enemy critical resources, critical vulnerabilities, and centers of gravity to achieve operational objectives prior to the enemy seizing their initial objectives. Enemies usually protect their critical assets with redundant systems to prevent attack. Joint forces attack the enemy’s operational forces and critical infrastructure to degrade its capability and disrupt the cohesion of its military operations. Penetrating antiaccess systems and networks may be necessary but is not an end unto itself. The purpose of penetrating the layers of enemy antiaccess capabilities and attriting area denial systems is to initiate offensive or counteroffensive operations.

g. Offensives may seek to infiltrate or penetrate enemy formations; seize terrain; or control geographic areas, resources, and population centers. Against a capable and adaptive enemy, the offensive is the most direct and sure means to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve operational-level objectives. Executing an offensive or counteroffensive compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing weakness JFCs can exploit. A successful series of offensives can place tremendous pressure on the enemy forces, creating a cycle of deterioration that can lead to their disintegration. Long-range joint fires, including land- and maritime-based missiles, strike aircraft, offensive space operations, cyberspace attack, and capabilities unique to Service components, provide offensive actions to protect and enable continuous attacks. Protection is critical and includes certain defensive measures required to continue the offensive. Once JFCs penetrate the enemy, they continue to disrupt C2 and network connectivity, destroy enemy forces, and take advantage of the freedom of maneuver. Successful offensive operations create and sustain advantages as JFCs maneuver to make penetrations and transition their attacks to exploitations and pursuits. Effective exploitation can begin to fracture the enemy’s coherence and ability to respond.

h. JFCs simultaneously employ conventional forces; special operations forces; and information, space, and cyberspace capabilities. Over time, the JFC may prioritize one line of effort or line of operation over others. As the situation unfolds and the enemy reacts, JFCs may shift their main effort from one line of effort to another. Regardless of the prioritization or designation of a main effort, other operations may continue simultaneously to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of action, or informational advantage. When joint operations prevent the enemy from concentrating or reconstituting forces, JFCs can isolate critical capabilities. At other times, JFCs can take actions to cause the enemy to concentrate their forces, facilitating the attack by friendly forces. Regardless of changing situations, JFCs orient operations on enemy critical resources, critical vulnerabilities, and centers of gravity. In attacking enemy centers of gravity, JFCs time their actions to
coincide with actions of other operations to overwhelm and degrade enemy decision making, forces, and resilience.

i. Transition and Adaptation

(1) JFCs adapt continuously and transition as necessary in anticipation of an enemy’s current and future actions. At some point during a joint force’s offensive or counteroffensive, the JFC may choose to pause the attack. This pause may be by design or as a result of enemy action. In combat, commanders should expect cycles of offensive and defensive operations. On every occasion the United States has engaged in sustained armed conflict against a peer enemy, the joint force has had to change warfighting methods, organizations, and capabilities to succeed in the new OE. As an element of operational art, adaptation to the OE is an essential skill for all commanders at every level. Adaptation is identifying and taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by enemy actions; recognizing chances to prevail; or taking necessary action to prevent stalemate, protraction, or failure.

(2) JFCs cannot anticipate changes in the OE perfectly or predict the precise actions of an adversary, but the assessment is continuous. Every campaign presents unforeseen challenges or circumstances. Joint commanders adjust to warfighting challenges in a timely manner to effectively exploit and seize opportunities presented by the adversary. The side that adapts its warfighting concepts and capabilities more quickly and effectively has a decided advantage.

(3) As JFCs continue to campaign and begin to impose their will on the enemy, diplomats seek to negotiate a settlement. Regardless of the outcome, JFCs maintain a long-term view toward the transition following armed conflict. Rarely do wars end with a simple cessation of hostilities. Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and institutions to a point where it is often impossible to return to the previous international order. Armed conflict’s potential destruction of government and societal institutions can create conditions for intense competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking advantage within a new order. Global or regional competitors can exploit these conditions by supporting resistance partners or surrogates in other ways. The transition period requires the joint force to campaign through combinations of activities associated with cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.

4. Renewed Competition

a. Clear conclusion and finality to armed conflict can be elusive. To make military victory meaningful, JFCs take on the timeless challenge of translating military success into enduring and favorable outcomes. There is no rulebook for translating military achievement into favorable outcomes. To successfully transition from armed conflict to the new competition, JFCs avoid viewing the continuing effort as requiring less focus and attention. Successful transition requires a mindset, posture, and readiness to continue offensive operations, if necessary, as the JFCs continue to orient on the enemy and new adversaries.
b. As a function of the cessation of armed conflict, the United States may impose terms, negotiate a settlement, establish an armistice, or accept nothing short of regime change. First, forcing an imposed settlement may occur through the selective destruction of critical functions or assets, such as C2 or infrastructure, or otherwise making the enemy unable to resist US will and resolve. Even for limited objectives, this can be by the threat of or actual occupation of a portion of an enemy’s territory. Second, a negotiated settlement through coordinated diplomatic, military, and economic actions convinces an enemy that yielding will be less painful than continuing to resist. In addition to imposed and negotiated settlement, there may be an armistice or truce, which is an intermission of armed conflict, not a reconciliation. In effect, it provides a way to gain time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of operations. Senior military and civilian leaders must weigh the efficacy of an armistice or truce against the potential damage done by relieving pressure on the threat.

c. Whether the United States imposes or negotiates a settlement, or the warring parties merely reach an armistice, the JFCs’ continuity of campaigning will have different characterizations depending on the situation. For example, in the case of an imposed settlement, the joint force will likely have to maintain an offensive-like posture and coercive action while communicating both compellence and deterrence threats. JFCs maintain a similar mindset for an armistice, which, in many cases, may endure and stabilize or evolve into a contentious cease-fire. In a negotiated settlement, over time, the joint force may be able to transition to a more defensive posture; however, continuing to confront the enemy may require maintaining significant combat forces forward. In the case of regime change, only a comprehensive, long-term effort and committed follow-through can deliver strategic objectives and prepare for the future. For each of these impositions, new competitions will emerge and challenge all operational and strategic accomplishments; the joint force cannot simply walk away or expect any level of permanence. JFCs should expect the moment that the joint force ceases protecting the wartime gains, enemies and adversaries will begin to probe, assault, and undo the hard-won achievements.

d. Consolidating and maintaining gains is an integral part of succeeding in armed conflict and is essential to retaining the initiative over enemies and adversaries. Success requires a continuing opportunity cost of military effort; otherwise, any notion of completeness or resolution suggested by a military victory may be irrelevant. JFCs anticipate the magnitude and attributes of effort required to achieve the appropriate measures of success, translate success into national policy outcomes, and prepare for the future.

e. Joint forces deliberately plan and prepare for the transition to capitalize on operational success. Planning considerations can include changes to the task organization and the additional assets required. These assets may include engineers, military police, civil affairs, and medical support, especially those assets required for the potential increase in stabilization and sustainment tasks. In some instances, JFCs lead the integrating and synchronizing activities. In other situations, the joint force is in support. The conduct of critical activities associated with consolidating gains may depend primarily on the JFC’s capability and capacity to support these activities.
f. When leading and directing actions during the transition, commanders establish and sustain security. Joint forces conduct continuous reconnaissance and, if necessary, gain or maintain contact with the enemy to defeat or preempt enemy action and retain the initiative. Consolidating gains may include eliminating or neutralizing isolated or bypassed threat forces to increase area security and protect lines of communications. Commanders ensure forces organize and prepare to confront enemy forces while simultaneously consolidating gains. Commanders maintain communication with the population to assist in their understanding of the overall goal. Psychological operations forces, public affairs, civil affairs forces, cyberspace forces, civil-military operations, and combat camera can assist in this effort.

g. JFCs understand that consolidating military gains might occur over a significant time. Consolidation should begin as soon as joint forces capture hostile or liberated territory, concurrent with, not after, the defeat of remaining enemy forces. Gradually, JFCs shift their emphasis to measures that address the need to restore order and stabilize OAs under their control, facilitate the process of reconciliation of belligerents, and, over time, establish the conditions necessary for a transfer of control to an interim or reconstituted civilian government. As an interim measure, the JFC may enable the transfer of control from joint forces to organizations such as local governing groups, interorganizational groups, or interagency partners. If indigenous governmental institutions are dysfunctional, belligerent, or nonexistent, the JFC may organize and execute interim military governance operations.

h. Ultimately, JFCs translate military success into acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes and expect to transition to a new competition and implement long-term approaches that maintain their campaigns’ focus over time. These activities might occur across several AORs. Whether in circumstances of cooperation, competition, or armed conflict, JFCs assess results with a global perspective, achieve objectives, and prepare for future operations. JFCs continue to support a stable diplomatic situation and an expanding network of like-minded allies and partners on terms that are compatible with and promote US interests. Maintaining this favorable situation within the new competition likely requires a continuing assessment of opportunity cost of an enduring military effort compared with alternative options.
CHAPTER VI
THE FUTURE OF JOINT WARFIGHTING

“The country that masters emerging technologies, combines them with doctrine, and develops the leadership to take advantage of it...the side that does that best is going to have...advantage at the start of the next war.”

General Mark Milley, United States Army
20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
26 May 2021

1. Anticipating the Next Operational Environment

   a. Introduction

      (1) The joint force is experiencing a fundamental change in the character of war. Changes in how, where, and with what weapons and technologies opposing sides fight are normal. However, fundamental change is rare, and it is influencing, accelerating, and expanding the next OE to the degree that future joint warfighting will require a new way of war fought by a force that does not yet exist, guided by doctrine, and led by leaders that we need to develop now. The future OE will be highly lethal and characterized by the ability to see and sense the OE like never before.

      (2) The future joint force must be stealthy, resilient, fast, distributed, agile, adaptive, in a constant state of motion, highly lethal, and, most important, survivable. It must fully integrate developing technologies, including precision long-range fires, hypersonic weapons, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, and pervasive sensors in all domains. The current rapidly changing technology will provide decisive advantage to the nations that can integrate and fuse the capabilities into military weaponry, doctrine, training, organization, and professional development. While aspects of these capabilities are present today, they are just emerging. These capabilities are not proliferated and a long way from mature.

      (3) The joint force operates in an environment in which strategic competition reshapes the distribution of power across the world, creating instability and increasing the potential for armed conflict. Anticipating the future OE and integrating modern technologies and techniques is necessary for the joint force to adapt. New warfighting technologies and doctrines have materialized repeatedly throughout history and will continue to do so. Some of these have limited impact, while others have profound effect. Identifying specifically which ones and to what extent new capabilities and methods will have the most impact on the future of warfare is difficult. However, the emerging trends are clear, and the joint force must address them.

   b. The Future OE

      (1) In the future, adversaries will pursue their strategic goals and objectives in an increasingly assertive and hostile manner by directly challenging the system of accepted
international norms with alternative sets of rules. Adversaries continue to expand their ability to combine diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power with technology to mount sustained challenges to US interests. The United States’ adversaries have long-term goals to match or surpass US global influence, displace US alliances, and revise the international order in their favor.

(2) JFCs must be able to recognize and adapt to rapid and fundamental changes. Adversaries already recognize the need to change and are rapidly adapting, evolving, and, in some cases, transforming their capabilities to offset the joint force’s historical advantages. The joint force must continue evolving concepts and doctrines to target apparent weakness or vulnerabilities in the current joint force’s preferred methods and capabilities. Future joint warfighting will rely more on the use of information and the way it connects a military’s forces through the concepts of C2; communications; cyberspace and space capabilities; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

(3) In the future, joint forces will operate independently in degraded communication environments with mission-type orders and challenged or contested logistics. Our strategic competitors are accelerating the modernization of their militaries. It is imperative for joint forces to continue their modernization. The joint force must simultaneously modernize and focus on the threats of today. The future OE requires that we have a modern advanced force that can fight and win. We must make fundamental changes to the joint force to deter armed conflict in the future.

(4) In the future, the advantage will reside with the opponent that collects the most vital information, accurately and quickly analyzes it, and then rapidly and securely disseminates it to the right commanders. Future warfighting requires combinations of inexpensive sensors and mass data analytics that revolutionize real-time detection and information processing. The increased integration of military and commercial technology presents new opportunities for greater redundant and resilient systems that can improve JFCs’ efforts to gain advantages throughout the OE. Many countries’ military departments are recognizing this potential and are actively working to capitalize on the potential of information to amplify their warfighting strategies and capabilities. Adversaries and allies alike are exploring how emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum technologies could usher in this unprecedented era of persistent surveillance and improve their decision making. Additionally, adversaries will continue operating in gaps and seams that cultural and institutional biases find challenging to address. Left unaddressed, these evolving adversary strategies increase the risk that the future JFCs and their formations may be disadvantaged across the competition continuum.

(5) The implications of this future are becoming clear. US adversaries will continue to challenge and contest JFCs globally, by creating risk of observation and attack—both lethal and nonlethal—in most places around the world. Adversaries work to fracture and disintegrate US and allied unity of effort by attacking C2 and communications links within the joint force but also between the joint force and its interagency and international allies and partners and the homeland. The future OE creates risk as adversaries seek to outmaneuver the joint force by directly shaping or disrupting US society.
(6) US adversaries continue to take increasingly aggressive actions to reshape their regions and revise the global order. They continue making significant investments in their military to improve technology and modernize their military forces. Through economic coercion, adversaries seek to expand their global influence and increase their ability to project military power. They are aggressively modernizing their military to protect authoritarian interests and preparing to use force if required. Our adversaries are strengthening their military to coerce others. These adversarial actions continue to move those nations down the path toward confrontation and armed conflict. Finally, our adversaries continue to develop significant nuclear, space, cyberspace, land, maritime, and air capabilities. They are working every day to close the technology gap with the United States and our allies.

(7) The protection of civilians is a priority. This issue becomes a prominent point of attack on the credibility of the United States and our allies when civilians are harmed. DoD is implementing specific actions to mitigate and respond to civilian harm. Means such as intermediate force capabilities and other capabilities that can create nonlethal effects may offer options to take necessary actions while reducing the likelihood of civilian harm.

(a) The Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) [short title: CHMR-AP], directed by SecDef, creates new institutions and processes that improve strategic outcomes, optimize military operations, and strengthen DoD’s ability to mitigate civilian harm during operations through a reinforcing framework. It facilitates continued learning throughout DoD, enhances DoD’s approach to assessments and investigations, and improves DoD’s ability to effectively respond when civilian harm occurs. The actions set forth in the CHMR-AP build upon each other to improve accountability and transparency regarding civilian harm resulting from US military operations.

(b) Hard-earned tactical and operational successes may ultimately end in strategic failure if care is not taken to protect the civilian environment as much as the situation allows—including the civilian population and the personnel, organizations, resources, infrastructure, essential services, and systems on which civilian life depends.

(8) US adversaries represent a real and growing national security challenge, and this is a matter of national urgency. The joint force will maintain our military superiority over our adversaries. While our adversaries are increasingly capable strategic competitors, it is imperative that we manage our relationships to avoid escalation to armed conflict. By maintaining a strong military with overmatch against our adversaries, the joint force can deter conflict. Through integrated deterrence, JFCs raise perceived costs to our adversaries and deter aggression. If deterrence fails, then the joint force will fight to prevail on terms favorable to the United States.

2. Harnessing the Advantage of Technology, Leadership, and Doctrine

a. The (U) Joint Warfighting Concept [short title: JWC] is the unifying vision to guide future force design, force development, and force employment to ensure we have the right technology, leaders, and doctrine. The JWC will continue to incorporate evolving threats
to help JFCs face the future. The concept includes fidelity on key warfighting concepts and precision on the operational approaches that will enable the joint force to gain positions of advantage against peer adversaries. Additionally, the concept contains an updated description of the overarching military challenges facing the joint force, a refined explanation of the military solution, and a detailed description of how the joint force will apply this solution. DoD builds a more lethal joint force by continuing to modernize technology, leader development, and doctrine and must continue to invest in capabilities that sustain its military overmatch, while strengthening alliances and attracting new partners. Present force providers must develop warfighting capabilities to sense, make sense of, and act at all levels of warfare, in multiple AORs, in all domains, and with partners to deliver information advantage at speed to forces and decision makers.

b. Our network of allies and partners is a strategic source of strength. The robust network—this team of teams—stands against the autocratic regimes that are uninterested in an open, free, and prosperous world. It is imperative to modernize the force, training, and doctrine within this framework to remain the most capable and ready force.

c. As adversaries improve their nuclear posture and potential nuclear threats continue to emerge, the joint force must modernize its nuclear forces; weapons complexes; and requisite nuclear command, control, and communications capabilities.

(1) **Rapid Technology Adaptation.** The present force providers must adapt now to ensure it succeeds in the future. To maintain our advantage, the joint force must improve its ability to integrate, defend, and reconstitute our surveillance and decision systems to achieve warfighting objectives, particularly in the space domain and in cyberspace and despite adversaries’ means of interference or deception.

(a) The joint force must have a long-range strike capability. Long-range fires provide significant offensive capabilities that can improve deterrence and survivability. By enabling power projection from standoff ranges, the risk to critical US assets decreases while the defensive burden imposed upon the enemy increases. These fires challenge an adversary’s logistics, C2, and basing, forcing them to choose between increased risk and decreased effectiveness. Our adversaries have capable, ground-launched, theater-range missiles that are difficult for the United States to defend against. Investments in long-range strike and hypersonic missiles launched from land, maritime, and air platforms can be a cost-effective strategy that improves our ability to compete with our adversaries.

(b) Our adversaries are undertaking hypersonic weapons testing and development from a variety of delivery platforms. These weapons operate at speeds greater than Mach 5. Their maneuverability makes them challenging to detect and defeat. Weapons operating at these speeds provide significant offensive capability that challenge an opponent’s decision timelines. Present force providers must invest in this technology to provide a suite of capabilities that provide transformational warfighting capability to the joint force.

(c) Militaries must be able to collect, analyze, and assess vast quantities of data to make effective decisions. The military that can make decisions fastest may have a decisive
advantage. Artificial intelligence has the potential to reform military decision-making processes at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare, to enable rapid assessments and decisions that outpace human abilities. Additionally, artificial intelligence combined with new military platforms could enable the proliferation of robots across the OE. Robots in the land, maritime, and air domains could provide significant quantities of firepower, logistics, and communications capabilities while decreasing risks to our military forces. Through human-machine teaming, each human warfighter would have exponentially increased abilities to shoot, move, and communicate in battle to prevail over the enemy.Regardless of how technology develops, JFCs employ artificial intelligence and robotics within the parameters of strategic guidance. There is the risk of a difficult challenge if an adversary uses artificial intelligence against the United States in a manner not congruent with our values, yet that gives the adversary a military advantage. Even in such circumstances, JFCs leverage artificial intelligence and robotics consistent with our values.

(d) Adversaries continue to use cyberspace operations to compete with the United States and attempt to gain an information advantage. Our adversaries repeatedly demonstrate their capability and will to conduct complex malicious cyberspace activities targeting our digital infrastructure, both military and commercial. US adversaries continue to undermine other nations’ sovereignty and create unstable security situations.

1. In multiple regions, US adversaries demonstrate their aggressiveness, resourcefulness, and opportunism. Malign cyberspace actors exploit commercial software vulnerabilities to gain network access and conduct cyberspace operations against US citizens, organizations, and institutions. The low-cost barrier to entry and attribution denialability makes this a priority method for adversaries to compete below armed conflict while minimizing risk of escalation. US adversaries use a range of cyberspace capabilities from exploiting information to cyberspace attacks to collect intelligence, position for future operations, impose costs, and signal to the United States and adversaries.

2. The joint force must increase our ability to compete and prevail in cyberspace while ensuring all elements of informational power integrate into operations, activities, and efforts to deter our adversaries and protect the US homeland. This requires investments in technology, building and maturing joint force readiness for cyberspace operations, reducing risk to weapon systems and critical infrastructure, strengthening cyberspace security, and improving network resiliency.

(e) The changing character of war necessitates that we continue to modernize and innovate our technology, capabilities, and training. Data, communication networks, and their interconnectedness are fundamental to how the United States trains, plans, and employs force. Present force providers must have rapid and robust linkages from sensors to shooters in a networked information environment. This capability requires investments in microelectronics and quantum computing to ensure we maintain a technological edge over our adversaries. The current globally distributed supply chains, as well as access to critical materials and rare earth metals, create vulnerabilities to the joint force’s ability to acquire necessary parts and technology. We must also find ways to deepen collaboration on advanced capabilities with our closest allies and partners.
(2) Developing Joint Warfighting Leaders

(a) Today’s joint and Service commanders must develop leaders who can think and act in time to present new and difficult problems for adversaries. Leadership in the future OE requires knowledge of how adversaries are evolving, combined with continual preparation of the joint force, to identify, encourage, field, and execute innovative solutions to emerging problems. To provide decisive advantages in future competition and war, future-focused leadership must anticipate and recognize new challenges and adapt to solve emerging problems faster than the adversary.

(b) The joint force is committed to growing our talent. The joint force competes for the talent of our youth, along with every other business and organization that seeks our nation’s best and brightest. The joint force’s objective is to field the most lethal and combat-effective fighting force in the world. The joint force will continue to support the accessions of qualified people to all jobs and positions within the joint force.

(c) The joint force must revise our leader development programs and our joint professional military education to enable the development of adaptable and agile leaders. The joint force must modernize our joint professional military education curricula to develop strategically and operationally minded joint warfighters who can anticipate future joint warfighting, think critically, and creatively apply military power. The joint force must orient on instructing mission command, operational agility, and ethics to ensure our military leaders can effectively employ forces at all levels of war and respond to dynamic battlefields. Additionally, the joint force must increase the amount of joint professional military education devoted to the study of the changing character of war and the future of joint warfighting.

(d) The joint force faces a future that demands a change in emphasis and urgency. Commanders at all levels must identify and select officers who can intellectually outthink our adversaries in competition and armed conflict. Retaining the most promising leaders at all levels is what creates success. It is essential that officers with the greatest potential to be the warfighting generals and admirals of the future attend resident war college programs. Additionally, those staff and war college programs must focus on developing joint warfighting leaders that are prepared for the future OE.

(e) Joint leader development is a function of the assessment and subsequent accession of quality applicants, developing their expertise, and retaining those leaders with the most talent and potential. Developing leaders is a product of training, staff and operational experience, education, exercises, and self-improvement. Senior leaders must prioritize attendance by leaders’ demonstrated talent, recognize potential for strategic responsibilities, and incentivize retention. The joint force must align the best talent and most qualified to the right professional military education track and then assign that expertise to the most critical strategic and operational assignments.

(f) Our alliances and partnerships are key to maintaining the rules-based international order and a stable and open international system promoting peace and prosperity. Through multinational force efforts to train, advise, and assist partners and
allies, as well as information and intelligence sharing, we continue to ensure terrorists do not possess the capability and capacity to exert their will. Terrorism’s root causes can only be addressed effectively by including governments of the region, and we can best influence outcomes with inclusive diplomatic, economic, information, stabilization, and counterterrorism efforts. Counterterrorism strategy works best with and through our regional allies and partners. JFCs seek to build our partners’ and allies’ capabilities, foster interoperability, and strengthen relationships. Doing so allows us, our allies, and our partners to counter the coercion of our strategic competitors, oppose the malign activity of regional threats, and meet the varied security challenges posed by state and non-state actors. The joint force is stronger when we operate closely with our allies and partners.

(3) **Doctrine.** The joint force continues to develop and employ new operational doctrine and enhance future warfighting capabilities to deter and prevail over the potential aggression of capable and committed adversaries. The joint force prioritizes a future force that has antiaccess/area denial strike capabilities that can penetrate adversary defenses at range—localized and temporary initially—but with increasing freedom of action as JFCs accumulate advantage; can securely and effectively provide sustainment to continue operations in a contested and degraded environment; maintains information and decision advantage; preserves C2; ensures critical detection and targeting operations; and continues generating combat power to support strike capabilities and enablers for sustainment, despite adversary attacks. Finally, the joint force must rapidly mobilize forces, generate combat power, and provide sustainment.

3. **Looking Ahead**

   a. Our adversaries will continue their aggressive attempts to revise the global order for their own benefits. They continue building up military might to achieve their goals through the use of force. Large countries’ use of military force to attack smaller countries and attempt to change recognized borders cannot go unchecked. The joint force will continue to work with interagency partners and in cooperation with our allies and foreign partners to deter aggression and threats to the free world.

   b. Previously, the United States has faced other capable adversaries, and we rose to meet their challenge. Armed conflict is not inevitable, but the risk is a reality. US military might make war less likely. Now and in the future, our contract with the people is that we, the US military, will always be ready to protect the Constitution and the fundamental principles of what it means to be American. We will always protect and defend this experiment in liberty, to deter our enemies, and, when necessary, fight and win.
Chapter VI

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APPENDIX A
LAW OF WAR

1. Policy

DoD policy requires all members of DoD components to comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however characterized. In all other military operations, members of DoD components continue to act consistent with the law of war’s fundamental principles and rules, which include those in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction, proportionality, and honor. The law of war comprises those treaties and customary international law binding on the United States that regulate the resort to armed force; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in international and non-international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent states. Sometimes also called the “law of armed conflict” or “international humanitarian law,” the law of war is specifically intended to address the circumstances of armed conflict. Consult the Department of Defense Law of War Manual for an authoritative statement on the law of war. The protection of civilians against the harmful effects of hostilities is one of the main purposes of the law of war. Specific rules for the protection of civilians include both the affirmative duty to take feasible precautions to protect civilians and other protected persons and objects, as well as the obligation to refrain from directing military operations against civilians and civilian infrastructure.

2. Commanders’ Responsibilities

CCDRs and subordinate commanders ensure joint forces are well-prepared to prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm. Civilian casualties caused by our armed forces erode trust and confidence in the United States. CCDRs ensure US military plans for armed conflict include considerations for the security, stabilization, and interim military governance of occupied or liberated territory until this responsibility transfers to a legitimate host-nation authority or other non-DoD authority. CCDRs recognize the law of war may also apply to cyberspace and space operations, to the extent that it has been determined to be applicable. CCDRs ensure that rules of engagement and rules for the use of force are clear, coordinated, shared, and enforced.

3. Legitimacy

Adherence to the law of war is essential to maintaining legitimacy. Legitimacy in the eyes of the US population, affected foreign populations, and the international community is necessary to set the conditions for strong support for military action and can further positively shape the OE.

For further guidance on the law of war and application of its principles, refer to the Department of Defense Law of War Manual; DoDD 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program; CJCSI 5810.01, Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program; and JP 3-84, Legal Support.
APPENDIX B
(CLASSIFIED APPENDIX, PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)
The development of JP 1, Volume 1, uses the following primary references:

1. **United States Law**
   a. Title 10, USC.
   b. Title 14, USC.
   c. Title 18, USC.
   d. Title 32, USC.
   e. Title 50, USC.

2. **Strategic Guidance and Policy**
   c. *(U)* 2020 *Defense Space Strategy Summary.*

3. **Department of Defense Publications**
   a. DoDD 2311.01, *DoD Law of War Program.*
   b. DoDD 3000.03E, *DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and NLW Policy.*
   c. DoDD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW).*
   e. DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification.*

4. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**
   a. CJCSI 3100.01E, *Joint Strategic Planning System.*
   b. CJCSI 3110.01K, *(U)* 2018 *Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).*
Appendix C

c. CJCSI 3210.06A, *Irregular Warfare.*
e. CJCSM 3105.01A, *Joint Risk Analysis Methodology.*
f. CJCSM 3130.03A, *Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance.*
g. CJCSM 3130.06C, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.*
h. JP 1-0, *Joint Personnel Support.*
i. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence.*
j. JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations.*
k. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics.*
l. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning.*
m. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System.*
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Directorate for Joint Force Development (J-7).

b. The Joint Staff J-7 would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their efforts in helping develop and review this capstone publication. Their dedication in supporting this publication has been instrumental and much appreciated.

   COL Barry       LCDR Eriksen
   MAJ Biser       LCDR Grofik
   Mr. Bradford    LCDR Hake
   MAJ Bruister    Maj Hatley
   LCDR Campbell   CAPT Lucas
   Capt Cannon    CPT McCawley
   Maj Coffey      LCDR O’Meara
   MAJ Dickey      MAJ Plaster
   MAJ Dimuzio     Maj Schardein
   Maj Dobson      Maj Tasso

3. Supersession (if required)

This publication supersedes JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Incorporating Change 1, 10 May 2017.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program’s (JLLP’s) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DoD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine development process by providing insights and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Insights and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Releasability

LIMITED. This JP is approved for limited release. The authors of this publication have concluded that information in this publication should be disseminated on an as-needed basis and is limited to common access cardholders. Requests for distribution to non-common access cardholders should be directed to the Joint Staff J-7.

7. Printing and Distribution

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a. The Joint Staff does not print hard copies of JPs for distribution. An electronic version of this JP is available on:

   (1) NIPRNET Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (limited to .mil and .gov users with a DoD common access card) and


b. Access to this unclassified publication is limited. This JP can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, National Guard Bureau, Joint Staff, and combat support agencies. However, reproduction authorization for this JP must be IAW lead agent/Joint Staff doctrine sponsor guidance.
### GLOSSARY

**PART I—SHORTENED WORD FORMS**

(ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>combatant command campaign plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCSTM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoDD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCP</td>
<td>functional campaign plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCP</td>
<td>global campaign plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFM</td>
<td>global force management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>national defense strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>national security strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>operational area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>regional campaign plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>strategic planning framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. JP 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*, 27 August 2023, Active Terms and Definitions

**all-domain.** Pertaining to all the physical domains (land, maritime, air, and space) and cyberspace. (Approved for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary.)

**area of responsibility.** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which the combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

**Armed Forces of the United States.** Collectively, all components of the United States Army, United States Marine Corps, United States Navy, United States Air Force, United States Space Force, and United States Coast Guard. Also called United States Armed Forces. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

**compellence.** The use of military force to influence an adversary to modify or desist ongoing behavior or do something they would rather not do. (Approved for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary.)

**component.** 1. One of the Service or functional subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. (JP 1, Vol 1) 2. In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity. (JP 4-0) (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

**contingency operation.** A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (Title 10, United States Code, Section 101[a][13]). (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary with JP 1, Vol 1, as the source JP.)

**conventional warfare.** A violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. (Approved for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary.)

**force.** An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, capabilities, and necessary support, or combination thereof. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

**global integration.** The continuous process required to achieve an arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges. (Approved for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary.)

**instruments of national power.** All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)
irregular warfare. A form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. Also called IW. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

joint. Organizations, activities, or missions, in which two or more significant elements of Military Departments operate under a single joint commander or leader. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

joint force. A force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments that operate under a single joint force commander. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or joint task force commander. Also called JFC. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander to accomplish a specific mission. Also called JTF. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

Military Department. Within the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force. Also called MILDEP. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

national defense strategy. The Secretary of Defense’s approach to implement the President’s national security strategy. Also called NDS. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

national military strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s strategic approach to implement the national defense strategy. Also called NMS. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

national security. Policy and actions to defend United States interests at home and abroad using the instruments of national power. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

national security strategy. A Presidential document for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve national objectives. Also called NSS. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1, Vol 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a military mission. (JP 3-0) (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary with JP 1, Vol 1, as the source JP.)
partner nation.  1. A nation with which the United States cooperates in a specific situation or operation. (JP 1, Vol 1) 2. In security cooperation, a nation with which the Department of Defense conducts security cooperation activities. Also called PN. (JP 3-20) (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

strategic competition. The persistent and long-term interaction that occurs between relevant actors pursuing their interests across the competition continuum. (Approved for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary.)

strategic environment. The set of complex, dynamic, and adaptive political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the others. (Approved for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary.)

task. A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned by an appropriate authority to an individual or organization, or derived during mission analysis, that must be accomplished. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

transregional. Pertaining to operations or activities that span more than one combatant commander’s area of responsibility. (Approved for inclusion in the DoD Dictionary.)

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

United States. A North American country consisting of 50 states, a federal district, and 14 territories, to include the land areas, internal waters, territorial seas, and airspace, over which the United States Government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility. (Approved for incorporation into the DoD Dictionary.)

2. Terms Removed from the DoD Dictionary

- Supersession of JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013; Incorporating Change 1, 10 May 2017: function; integration; National Security Council; resources; theater
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volumes 1 and 2, is the capstone joint doctrine publication.** The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY**

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 1, Volumes 1 and 2, is the capstone joint doctrine publication.** The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process: